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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a capabilities-based approach to assessing the bioterrorism 
threat from non-state actors.  Through comparative case study, prior bioterrorism attacks 
are analyzed to assess capability in the three areas necessary to complete a biological 
weapons attack:  obtaining or isolating a pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and 
employing or disseminating the weapon.  The three cases are the Rajneeshee cult in 1984, 
the Aum Shinrikyo cult in the early 1990s, and the United States Postal System anthrax 
attacks of 2001.  In contrast to current wisdom that employing biological weapons is too 
difficult for non-state actors, this thesis reveals a broad spectrum of capability in all 
studies in the areas necessary to culminate an attack.  Application of these findings must 
be used to assess risk generally rather than against specific groups because capability is 
deemed to be extremely difficult to track.  The thesis finds that a significant threat exists 
but not large enough to be over-hyped above other national security concerns.  In light of 
this, recommendations are provided for U.S. biodefense policy emphasis in the areas of 
the nonproliferation regime, attribution capabilities, and defending against the changing 
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I. INTRODUCTION:  HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES 
ASSESS THE BIOTERRORISM THREAT? 
A. PURPOSE 
The U.S. government considers biological warfare and terrorism among the 
greatest threats to U.S. national security.  President Bush stated on February 11, 2004, 
“armed with a single vial of a biological agent, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, 
could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.  America, and 
the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the 
danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose.”1  Other experts are divided.  Scholars 
such as Joshua Lederberg portray biological terrorism as a huge threat, while others, such 
as Milton Leitenberg, downplay the risks and believe the U.S. government is over-hyping 
the dangers and spending biodefense money in the wrong places.2  What framework 
should the government use to assess the risk, and what is the actual threat level? 
1. A Framework for Assessing the Threat 
In today’s post-9/11 environment, assessing the terrorism threat is a top priority.  
Different methodologies exist for conducting a risk or threat analysis yet most generally 
utilize similar criteria for evaluation.  Terrorist intent and capability, a potential weapon’s 
destructive power (criticality), society’s vulnerability to an attack, and terrorist capability 
to carry out an attack are common to many risk assessments.3  One construct for 
                                                 
1 “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” (Washington, D.C.:  The White House, April 28, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html (accessed December 2005). 
2 For an example of Lederberg’s commentary on the bioterrorism threat, see Joshua Lederberg, ed., 
Biological Weapons:  Limiting the Threat, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA:  MIT 
Press, 1999).  For an example of Leitenberg’s viewpoints on the bioterrorism threat and biodefense focus, 




(accessed December 2006), and Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism 
Threat (Carlisle, PA:  Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2005), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB639.pdf (accessed December 2006). 
3 For two examples of threat and risk assessment methodologies, see “Assessing and Managing the 
Terrorism Threat,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
September 2005, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210680.pdf (accessed December 2006) and Raymond 
A. Zilinskas, “Bioterrorism Threat Assessment and Risk Management Workshop,” Final Report and 
Commentary Presented to the U.S. Department of Energy, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, June 24, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/biorisk.pdf (accessed 
December 2006). 
2 
assessing the terrorism threat encompasses all of these factors in three broad areas:  
Threat = Vulnerability x Intent x Capability.4 
Vulnerability.  U.S. vulnerability to any type of terrorism is undeniable no matter 
how many resources are invested in the problem.  In congressional testimony, Secretary 
of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, concedes that the country cannot defend against 
all attacks without bankrupting the government.5  The United States is and will always be 
vulnerable to some level of terrorism which varies depending on the type and intended 
target. 
Intent.  Many times terrorist intent is difficult to interpret especially now that 
terrorist groups have crossed the threshold from traditional attacks to utilizing 
unconventional means.  These include truck bombings as in the Oklahoma City and 
African Embassy bombings and suicide bombings such as those of the USS Cole and the 
9/11 attacks.  Terrorist attempts to use biological weapons (BW) have increased in the 
past twenty years as well.  The Rajneeshee cult in 1984 in Oregon, Aum Shinrikyo in 
Japan from 1990 to 1994, an unknown perpetrator spreading anthrax in the fall of 2001, 
and the ricin plot in the United Kingdom in 2002 are relatively recent examples.  Al 
Qaeda still has the intent to employ BW today.  It pursued BW as discovered during U.S. 
military operations in Afghanistan in late 2001 to early 2002.  In September 2006, Iraqi 
Al Qaeda leader, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, released an audiotape calling for scientists and 
experts in explosives to join the jihad and test unconventional biological and nuclear 
(dirty) bombs on the United States.6   
Intent is a variable uncontrollable by the U.S. government and demanding to 
assess.  Unlike intent, determining the vulnerability of U.S. assets to terrorism is difficult 
                                                 
4 Richard F. Pilch, “The Bioterrorist Threat in the United States,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism:  
Understanding the New Security Environment, ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, CT:  
MacGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002), 208. 
5 Eric Lipton, “U.S. Can’t Protect All Targets, Chertoff Says,” New York Times, New York, NY:  
September 13, 2006, A21, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=194&did=1126493951&SrchMode=3&sid=
1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1158248471&clientId=11969&
aid=1 (accessed December 2006). 
6 “Audiotape From Al Qaeda In Iraq Leader Calls on Scientists to Join Jihad,” Fox News, September 
28, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,216262,00.html (accessed December 2006). 
3 
yet possible.  The country can at least take action to mitigate terrorist attacks.7  In 
contrast, assessing and influencing intent is extremely difficult due to the thousands of 
terrorist groups and potential lone actors, causing intelligence assets to be too over-tasked 
and unable to realistically assess them all.  Scientist-in-Residence of the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
Richard Pilch states, “while it is of course possible to have a best guess with respect to 
this issue, there is always some underlying level of uncertainty.  Thus, from a policy-
making standpoint intent must be assumed.”8   
Capability.  Revisiting the equation, Threat = Vulnerability x Capability x Intent, 
a framework for assessing the bioterrorism risk becomes clearer.  If threat is evaluated in 
terms of only vulnerability, the overall risk is astronomical.  The United States is very 
vulnerable because of the vast spectrum BW agents can be employed across, and as 
Secretary Chertoff says, completely eliminating vulnerability is impossible.  If the threat 
is measured only in terms of terrorist intent, risk must be assumed because ascertaining it 
from the thousands of groups worldwide is perhaps even more challenging.  Threat must 
be assumed to be high from this perspective as well. 
If threat is measured in terms of capability, the level of risk can vary from 
negligible to extremely high.  Capability allows for variation away from just a high threat 
level despite vulnerability and intent driving the overall assessment to this point.  For 
these reasons, capability becomes the one factor in the equation that allows for varying 
risk assessments for bioterrorism and more importantly, offers a balanced approach to 
this problem.  The necessity exists for the government to gauge BW terror capabilities in 
order to realistically determine the threat. 
2. Thesis Argument 
The bioterrorism threat from non-state actors is real and significant.  In the past, 
attacks succeeded because groups achieved capability in the areas necessary to carry out 
such an attack.  These include:  obtaining or isolating pathogens, weaponizing agents, and 
                                                 
7 For information on the government task of assessing vulnerability to critical infrastructure and key 
assets, see The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures And Key Assets 
(Washington, D.C.:  The White House, February 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical_strategy.pdf (accessed December 2006). 
8 Pilch, “The Bioterrorist Threat in the United States,” 233. 
4 
effectively employing the biological weapon.9  When they failed to successfully employ 
the weapon, groups either postponed or terminated bioweapons development of their own 
accord or were interdicted by authorities.  They did not necessarily succumb to technical 
challenges and lack of capability.  They either stopped or were stopped along the way.  
Furthermore, in the cases where groups failed, capability existed to eventually overcome 
most technical problems had they not terminated operations.  If this argument proves 
correct, the threat of BW use by terrorists exists and is not over-hyped. 
Analyzing prior bioattacks for capability is relevant to the threat picture today and 
in the future.  As terrorists groups gain capability through personal trial and error and the 
experiences of others, the overall level of risk increases.  By revealing the fundamental 
capabilities of past bioterrorists, the United States can better ascertain where the 
minimum capability was and how that has evolved over time.  Knowing this permits 
better threat assessment which in turn drives more effective biodefense policy to enhance 
national security.  This thesis explores three historical cases to determine what factors 
impact the outcome of the attacks.  The cases are the Rajneeshee cult’s use of salmonella 
in 1984 in the United States, the anthrax attacks in the United States during the fall of 
2001, and the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attempted use of anthrax and botulinum toxin during 
the early 1990s in Japan.  The overall threat assessment developed in this thesis stems 
from the terrorists groups’ capability revealed in these studies.  The thesis concludes with 
recommendations to U.S. biodefense policy based on this assessment. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Potential biological agent use runs the gamut from agroterrorism destroying large 
amounts of produce or livestock—to minor sicknesses such as salmonella poisoning—to 
unleashing a full-scale pandemic such as smallpox killing millions of people.  Biological 
terrorism benefits from greater numbers of microbiologists and associated technicians 
                                                 
9 Three requirements to successfully carry out a biological weapon attack are cited broadly across the 
literature.  For three examples, see Leitenberg, “Bioterrorism Hyped,”  John Mintz, “Technical Hurdles 
Separate Terrorists From Biowarfare,” The Washington Post, Washington, D.C.:  December 30, 2004, A1, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/pqdweb?index=17&did=772016871&SrchMode=1&sid=9
&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1160764359&clientId=11969 
(accessed December 2006), and Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat. 
5 
than either the nuclear or chemical weapons communities offer worldwide.10  
Additionally, open-source material availability on the subject, ever-increasing gains in 
biotechnology sciences, and the inexpensive equipment needed to produce BW make 
these types of weapons a tantalizing choice for terrorists.11   
1. Effects of Biological Weapons 
The possible effects of BW make it appealing to terrorist groups considering 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks.  Viruses, bacteria, and toxins have different 
potential for producing casualties yet all are useful in different scenarios.  Similar to 
nuclear or chemical weapons, BW can produce significant devastation.  A one megaton 
hydrogen bomb could kill anywhere from 500,000 to nearly two million people.  An 
aerial delivery of 1,000 Kg of Sarin nerve gas could kill up to 10,000 individuals 
depending upon environmental conditions.  In contrast, in the same aerial delivery and 
variable conditions, 100 Kg of anthrax may kill over 100,000 to nearly three million 
people.12  The large infrastructure and expenses of developing or acquiring a nuclear 
weapon make it less inviting for terrorist groups.  Both chemical and biological weapons 
can be manufactured with a much smaller footprint than nuclear weapons.  Moreover, 
biotechnology today allows BW development to be conducted in extremely small areas 
with easily obtainable equipment.  These relatively low barriers to entry combined with 
the high potential for casualties make the BW terror threat important to assess correctly. 
2. The Dual-Use Dilemma 
The footprint of the equipment and material necessary to manufacture biological 
weapons is very small compared to that of nuclear or even chemical weapons.  More 
importantly, almost all of these items are dual-use in nature, meaning they would be 
found legally in pharmaceutical laboratories or in biological weapons facilities.  Very few 
                                                 




=1 (accessed December 2006). 
11 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993), 38, 
http://www.anthrax.mil/documents/library/proliferation.pdf (accessed December 2006). 
12 Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity, British Medical Association (United Kingdom:  Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 1999), 25, and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
6 
differences exist between the two manufacturing processes until one decides to 
disseminate a weapon instead of manufacture a vaccine.  Figure 1 illustrates this dual-use 
dilemma: 
 
Figure 1.   The Dual-Use Dilemma13 
 
Both production methods must somehow obtain or naturally isolate a pathogen.  
Next, they manipulate the pathogen to gain the desired properties of the agent whether for 
vaccines or virulence of a weapon.  The two processes diverge slightly during 
employment of a weapon versus vaccine; however, the equipment and technology needed 
to do either are similar if not exactly the same.  Furthermore, large stockpiles are not 
necessary with biological weapons.  Until actually needed, a virulent specimen can be 
kept in small quantities awaiting full-scale production in order to keep the footprint small.  
Since the dual-use problem exists, proliferation of biological weapons can be done easily 
and has progressed over the past few decades. 
 
                                                  
13 Peter R. Lavoy, “Today’s WMD Threat:  Are We Prepared?” Class Lecture, Counterproliferation, 
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA:  October 2005. 
7 
3. Proliferation of Biological Weapons 
Proliferation of biological weapons by countries around the world is troubling.  
The Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC) was signed in 1972 and went 
into force in 1975.  Since then “the number of countries possessing or actively pursuing 
BW has more than doubled, from five to roughly a dozen today, including some member-
states of the Convention.”14  The increase in the number of countries with BW 
capabilities increases the chances a terrorist group will obtain agents, technology, or 
hands-on assistance. 
The number of sub-state agencies holding deadly pathogens around the world is 
staggering and exacerbates the problems associated with state proliferation.  The World 
Federation of Culture Collections (WFCC) is an association of 472 germ repositories 
spanning 61 countries.  Forty-six germ banks contain anthrax according to the WFCC.  
Another 1,000 germ banks throughout the world are not members of the group and those 
locations are not properly controlled.15  As late as 2004, a Department of Health and 
Human Services report which studied handling and security of select agents at 11 U.S. 
universities said, “Serious weaknesses compromised the security of select agents at all 
universities reviewed.”16  With nearly 1,500 germ banks worldwide and security 
questioned at two-thirds of them, the threat of terrorist groups gaining access to 
dangerous agents is undeniably real. 
4. U.S. Vulnerability to Biological Weapons 
Vulnerability of the United States to bioterrorism exists in two major areas:  1) 
agriculture to include crops and livestock and 2) society in general.  Bioterrorism’s 
potential use against agriculture is staggering.  Post-9/11, agriculture and its associated 
                                                 
14 “Limiting the Acquisition and Use of Biological Weapons by Strengthening the BWC,” Nuclear 
Threat Initiative, NTI WMD411, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f2j.html (accessed December 2006) and “Chemical and Biological Weapons:  
Possession and Programs Past And Present,” Chemical and Biological Weapons Resource Page, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm (accessed December 2006). 
15 Cited in Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Keeping Track of Anthrax: The 
Case for a Biosecurity Convention,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 58, no. 3, May/June 2002, 57-62, 
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=mj02barletta (accessed December 2006). 
16 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 did improve 
overall select agent security at U.S. institutions after full implementation in late 2003.  “Summary Report 
On Select Agent Security At Universities,” Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector 
General, March 2004, 2, http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region4/40402000.pdf (accessed December 2006). 
8 
infrastructure were added to the national list of critical infrastructure and key assets as an 
area necessary to protect.17  Agriculture accounts for one-sixth of the U.S. gross domestic 
product, employs the largest number of workers of any employment segment, and 
accounts for over $50 billion per year in economic exports.18  Bioattacks against this 
sector concern not only edibility of food for consumption but economic markets and the 
American confidence in the government’s ability to protect a vital commodity. 
Society in general is susceptible to attacks as well.  The Rajneeshee’s salmonella 
attack perpetrated through restaurant salad bars and the anthrax attacks of 2001 
committed via the U.S. postal system clearly illustrate this point.  Terrorists can and have 
attacked a vast array of targets with anything from mild pathogens to very deadly ones, 
instilling fear and making a bold statement about a group’s ability to inflict damage. 
5. Historical Focus on Biological Terrorism 
Bioterrorism received little attention in the United States until the mid-1990s.  
The first publicly recognized U.S. bioattack prior to October of 2001 was perpetrated by 
the Rajneeshees in 1984, but the attack was not officially attributed as a BW attack until 
1997.19  In the past ten years, there have been three monumental biological terrorism 
events.  The Aum Shinrikyo cult attempted multiple bioattacks in Japan during the early 
to mid-1990s; anthrax was employed through the USPS in 2001; and Al Qaeda was 
discovered to be much further along than previously believed in their BW development.20  
The modern age of bioterrorism arrived 20 years ago and has been slowly progressing, 
but the United States missed recognizing its arrival. 
Attention to the problem of bioterrorism has varied widely during this time and 
has failed to touch on some of the core issues, specifically the reasons behind the 
outcomes of bioattacks and what capabilities exist in sub-state groups to determine threat.  
When the literature does address the issue, experts are divided on the threat level. 
                                                 
17 The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures And Key Assets, 36. 
18 Henry S. Parker, “Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat,” McNair Paper 
no. 65, March 2002, x, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/mcnair65.pdf (accessed December 2006). 
19 W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes:  The Illicit use of Biological Agents since 1900 
(Washington, D.C.:  Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 1998), 4, 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/CCFull.pdf (accessed December 2006). 
20 Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, 26-27. 
9 
C. DISAGREEMENT ON THE THREAT LEVEL 
Expert opinions about the bioterrorism threat level reflect a large range of beliefs.  
When analyzing the literature, disagreement characterizes the discussion with most 
falling near the Lederberg or Leitenberg schools of thought. 
Joshua Lederberg, Professor Emeritus and Sackler Foundation Scholar at 
Rockefeller University, believes a major BW threat exists worldwide.  BW’s potential 
lethality combined with great unpredictability make the threat what it is today.  Lederberg 
hints at capability being the issue in his concern over the acceleration of biotechnology 
and science.21  He believes amateur bioterrorists could cause over a thousand casualties 
while terrorist groups with good monetary funding could cause 10 ten to 100 times that 
amount of damage.  Lederberg thinks that U.S. vulnerability to BW attacks is high, and 
that the threat, “is probably the most perplexing and gravest security challenge we 
face.”22 
In the opposing camp, a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, 
Milton Leitenberg, believes the specter of bioterrorism to be greatly exaggerated.  The 
ideas of terrorism and biological weapons were merged into a single threat, causing 
bioterrorism to receive undue attention.  In reality, state BW programs were a large threat 
in the 1990s, but their combination with terrorism or bioterrorism was not a problem.23  
Leitenberg focuses most exclusively on capability as does this thesis, but his conclusions 
focus on what others in the scholarly and policy communities have exaggerated and on 
unrealistic exercise scenarios used by the U.S. government.24  He does not delve into the 
reasons causing the outcomes of the bioattacks.  In general, he believes the U.S. 
government should move away from preparing for high-casualty attacks and strengthen 
the public health system to deal with more realistic scenarios such as flu pandemics and 
other natural outbreaks that kill thousands each year. 
                                                 
21 Joshua Lederberg, “Epilogue,” in Biological Weapons:  Limiting the Threat, ed. Joshua Lederberg, 
BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1999), 325-327. 
22 “Biological Warfare,” News and Notes, Report Summary, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, vol. 7, no. 6 (November-December 2001), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no6/lederberg.htm (accessed December 2006). 
23 Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, 43. 
24 Ibid, 43-64. 
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Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation marginalizes the threat similarly to 
Leitenberg.  He contends the U.S. government is over occupied with WMD terrorism, 
and any type of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons will be small-scale in 
nature to achieve a specific objective rather than mass destruction.  Hoffman believes a 
biological attack could have great ramifications from economic and psychological 
perspectives, but that overweighting large-scale biological or WMD attacks misses the 
lessons learned from previous events.25  To his and other optimists’ defense, terrorists 
have not conducted a mass-casualty BW attack to date. 
Jonathon Tucker, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, CA, 
sided more with Lederberg about the risk of bioterrorism but more recently shifted 
viewpoints.  In his book, Toxic Terror, Tucker states too much analysis of threat has been 
accomplished from the perspective of vulnerability.  With capability and intent of 
terrorist groups being the other elements of threat, he focused on motivation and intent in 
his study.26  He concludes “society should be less concerned with the terrorist use of 
CBW [chemical and biological weapons] agents per se, and more concerned with mass-
casualty terrorism from any source.”27  Tucker does not evaluate the threat from a 
capabilities perspective but warns of the large-scale devastation possible from BW use.  
More recently, he took on a more skeptical stance on the Bush administration’s threat 
assessments focusing on genetically-engineered pathogens.  Tucker downplays this for 
several reasons:  terrorists lack the technology necessary for the task, predicting terrorist 
                                                 
25 After dinner address delivered at the "Terrorism and Beyond: The 21st Century” Conference, co-
sponsored by the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and The 
RAND Corporation, 17 April 2000, http://www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.asp#title (accessed December 2006).  
For additional perspective from Hoffman, see:  Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1998), 185-213. 
26 Jonathon B. Tucker, “Introduction,” in Toxic Terror:  Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathon B. Tucker, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA:  
MIT Press, 2000), 1. 
27 Jonathon B. Tucker, “Lessons From The Case Studies,” in Toxic Terror:  Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathon B. Tucker, BCSIA Studies in International Security 
(Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 2000), 268. 
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intentions is difficult and unreliable, and this type of work could be construed to violate 
the BTWC causing a BW arms race.28 
Similarly to Tucker, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard University, Jessica Stern analyzes the threat more from a 
terrorist motivation and organizational structure perspective but does touch briefly on 
capability.  She minimizes the number of groups interested in any type of WMD use and 
even more so mass casualties.  This assessment, along with her belief that the BW 
technical obstacles are difficult to overcome, dictates a reduced risk; however, she thinks 
the U.S. government must be ready for unconventional terrorism—mostly in the area of 
consequence management because she concedes attacks will inevitably happen.29 
Other experts are staunch supporters of the Lederberg threat assessment and some 
even take it further.  One such individual is Steven Block, Professor of Biological 
Sciences and Applied Physics at Stanford University and a member of JASON, a group 
of advisory scientists to the U.S. government.  He perceives the BW risk from terrorist 
groups to be extremely high.  Block suggests that just because the technical hurdles of 
acquisition and delivery are difficult and some experts over-exaggerate the simplicity of 
bioterrorism does not mean the country can disregard the threat.  Terrorists groups can 
and will overcome those obstacles in ways currently unthinkable.  He reasons that the 
fear generated by bioattacks combined with the public health system’s vulnerability to 
being incapacitated make BW a grave threat.30  Block alludes to capability in his 
assessment as the central idea behind the inherent BW threat in modern terrorist groups. 
Leonard Cole, Adjunct Professor of Science at Rutgers-Newark in Jew Jersey, 
and Malcolm Dando, Director of the Bradford Disarmament Research Center at the 
University of Bradford, speak of the BW threat in similar terms.  They foresee an 
expanding threat in the new century due to acceleration in biotechnology and non-state 
                                                 
28 Jonathon B. Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment:  Is the Cure Worse Than The Disease?” Arms 
Control Today, October 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp (accessed December 
2006). 
29 Jessica Stern, “Terrorist Motivations and Unconventional Weapons,” in Planning The Unthinkable:  
How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. 
Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2000), 227-229. 
30 Block, “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons.” 
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actors’ possible use of BW not only in WMD attacks but in small-scale attacks against 
less expected targets.  Cole states that prevention and detection become extremely 
difficult when a group or individual has the will, intent, and capability to perpetrate a BW 
attack.31  In this statement, he suggests that with the existence of intent, capability 
ultimately defines the threat. 
Pilch assesses the threat solely as capability based; however, he does not find the 
threat to be high.  Despite this similar assessment to Leitenberg, he concludes that the 
country must prepare for low probability yet high consequence events like anthrax due to 
their possible destruction on agriculture and society, the U.S. economy, and the American 
psyche.32  This view seems to mix vulnerability into the assessment by implying the 
country is extremely susceptible to bioattack effects.  Preparing for the worst-case 
scenario is the only prudent course of action as if the threat were quite high—failure to 
not prepare is too disastrous.  Staunch biodefense is required despite the threat level 
based purely on potential devastation. 
As illustrated by this broad range of experts in the WMD and biological terrorism 
communities, threat of bioterrorism by non-state actors is judged to be high, low, and 
anywhere in between.  These experts do not agree on how to assess the risk as shown by 
the focus of their studies:  some focus on motivation or intent of terrorists, others focus 
on organizational structure of terrorist groups enabling them to attempt WMD attacks, 
and still others choose to review different aspects of group capability or simply U.S. 
vulnerability. 
Leitenberg, Pilch, and others utilize certain aspects of capability to assess the 
bioterrorism threat but come to very different conclusions.  This thesis uniquely uses 
multiple historical case studies to focus on capability and analyze reasons for different 
degrees of successful use of BW to add to the discussion on the actual risk both today and 
in the future. 
                                                 
31 Comments from Malcolm Dando and Leonard A. Cole, “Bioweapons, Proliferation, and the U.S. 
Anthrax Attack,” Conference on Terrorism, Transnational Networks, and WMD Proliferation:  Indications 
and Warning in an Era of Globalization, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA:  July 25-27, 2006.  For 
more on Cole’s BW threat predictions, see:  Leonard A. Cole, The Eleventh Plague (New York:  W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1997), 2-4. 
32 Pilch, “The Bioterrorism Threat in the United States,” 233. 
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D. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Case Selection 
Three cases were selected:  the Rajneeshees cult attacks in The Dalles, Oregon in 
1984; the Aum Shinrikyo cult attacks from 1990 to 1994 in and around Tokyo, Japan; 
and the USPS anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001.  The selections meet the following 
criteria necessary for this study:  non-state actors perpetrated the attacks against human 
targets; the data for analysis is thorough with sources to validate the data; and all involve 
groups with different motivations, financial backgrounds, settings, and/or organizational 
structures (to alleviate conclusions that attack outcomes appear similar due to the type of 
organization).  Although the U.S. anthrax attacks are unsolved to date, it is a critical case 
study for U.S. biodefense, and it would be remiss to leave it out of the study. 
2. Methodology 
Through comparative case study, common explanations are outlined for the 
outcomes of the attacks.  Experts claim that bioterrorism fails for lack of capability in the 
complex tasks necessary to bring BW to fruition.  To assess this claim, the cases are 
analyzed through a framework incorporating three major aspects of BW development that 
terrorist groups require for success—obtaining, weaponizing, and employing.  In 
analyzing whether past bioattacks fail for reasons other than those based on purely 
capability, this thesis will show whether terror groups have actually developed multiple 
capabilities over time, which in turn might elevate the overall threat. 
a. Analysis Criteria 
To standardize the analysis across the three cases, ten criteria were 
selected to evaluate capability and levels of success.  They fall within the three areas 
required to successfully carry out a BW attack: 
• Obtaining or isolating the agent: 
• Did the group have legal or illegal access to the pathogen?   
• Did the group have the monetary resources to acquire the 
pathogen? 
• Did the group have legal access to order the pathogen from 
a germ bank? 
• Did the group have the ability to steal the pathogen from 
any laboratory setting? 
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• If unable to obtain the pathogen, did the group possess the 
technical ability to isolate it naturally? 
• Weaponizing the agent: 
• Is the agent suitable for production? 
• Is the agent economically feasible for production? 
• Is the agent safe for those producing it? 
• Is the group capable of production of the selected agent? 
• Is the necessary equipment complex/difficult to obtain or 
simple/commonplace to acquire? 
• Is the technical expertise available for agent production? 
• Employing the biological weapon: 
• Is the agent easily transported? 
• Is the agent easily disseminated? 
• Can the agent survive in the dissemination environment? 
• Is the pathogen highly infectious/sufficiently virulent to cause 
sickness and/or death? 
• Does natural widespread immunity exist against the pathogen? 
• Is viable protection available to those disseminating the agent? 33 
These ten criteria and their sub-criteria are derived from common but 
broader aspects of BW implementation necessary for groups to overcome to successfully 
obtain, weaponize, and employ a weapon.  Although other criteria exist, those selected 
are prevalent themes and others were developed to delve into the core of terrorist group 
capabilities necessary to accomplish the three major steps.  Within the ten criteria where 
applicable, “availability” and “ease of use” are accounted for because they help 
characterize varying levels of success thereby impacting the overall threat.  Since this 
thesis is analyzing capability to assess the overall threat, focusing on capabilities-based 
criteria facilitates uncovering groups’ inherent abilities and whether or not that ability has 
                                                 
33 These criteria are generated from multiple descriptions of the criteria necessary for successful BW 
employment.  For four examples, see Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, 22-24, Technologies Underlying 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Background Paper United States Congress (Washington, D.C.:  Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1993), 77, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/ota/934405.pdf (accessed December 
2006), Jerrold M. Post, Laurita M. Denny, and Polina Kozak, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism,” 
in Avoiding the Abyss:  Progress, Shortfalls, and the Way Ahead in Combating the WMD Threat, 2nd 
edition, ed. Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider (Maxwell AFB, AL:  USAF Counterproliferation Center, 
July 2005), 86, and Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals:  
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2005), 58-59. 
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improved over time and through other BW events.  If other criteria not based on 
capability become apparent as reasons for failure, they are addressed as contributing 
factors.  This approach helps to reveal non-capability issues to address with biodefense 
policy while simultaneously evaluating whether or not overcoming those hurdles for BW 
use is even possible for terrorist groups. 
b. Defining Success 
Defining success or failure in the context of a BW attack is an elusive 
task.  If one looks for success against a terror group’s strategic objectives, knowing a 
group’s exact objectives of the attacks is crucial.  In the case of both the Rajneeshees and 
Aum Shinrikyo, the objectives are thought to be known; however, despite all of the 
research and analysis of the groups, strategy remains somewhat ambiguous due to:  the 
types of closed groups involved, lack of timeliness in the investigations, and in the case 
of Aum Shinrikyo, events taking place in a foreign country.  The anthrax attacks of 2001 
prove even more unclear from this perspective because assumptions must be made 
because strategy and objectives are unknown until the perpetrators are caught.  Moreover, 
a terrorist group failing to meet objectives does not constitute lack of capability.  Many 
factors outside the realm of this study could affect that facet of an attack despite a group 
having tactically employed BW successfully. 
In order to isolate the definition of success used here from an actor’s 
objectives, the case studies measure success from an operational point of view.  Did the 
terrorist group tactically employ BW?  To answer this question affirmatively, it 
necessitates the group accomplishing three phases.  They must have obtained or isolated a 
pathogen, weaponized the agent, and deliberately employed it against a target regardless 
of the overall effect of the attack.  All criteria evaluated within each phase are not 
required to classify all three phases a subsequent success and denote the attack as fully 
accomplished.  This allows for varying levels of success to develop capability for 
subsequent BW use. 
While the definition of success is important, the cornerstone of the thesis 
is not entirely in determining success or failure.  The primary objective is twofold:  1) to 
determine if any groups succeeded in overcoming the technical obstacles to employing  
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BW to establish capability and 2) more importantly, if groups failed to tactically employ 
BW, determine why they failed—was it lack of capability or for other reasons?   
Leitenberg states with respect to the U.S. anthrax attacks that whether the perpetrator had 
outside help or independently developed these bioagents would greatly change the 
country’s view on the level of the bioterrorism threat.34  His statement implies that how 
and why the terrorists succeeded in employing this dangerous agent greatly affects the 
nature of the bioterrorism threat.  This thesis’ methodology aims to explain failures of 
these groups and the capability displayed in any successes in order to determine the 
overall threat posed by BW. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis contains five chapters and three case studies.  Chapter I outlines the 
following:  the bioterrorism threat dilemma; a literature review of terrorism experts’ 
opinions on the current threat level and generally how they analyzed the data to assess 
overall risk; a methodology to analyze each case; and a roadmap for the entire thesis.   
Chapters II, III, and IV support the argument presented in Chapter I through 
comparative case studies.  To the extent available, the chapters provide background on 
the terrorist groups.  Information on pathogens, events leading up to the actual bioattacks 
and their effects follow this description.  Each attack is then analyzed against the ten 
criteria within the three phases of an attack (obtaining/isolating, weaponizing, and 
employing).  The conclusions in each case study comment on two areas based on the 
analysis:  reasons for success or failure and assessed capability. 
Chapter V integrates the analysis and lessons learned from each case study to 
synthesize a list of common capability-type attributes contributing to the outcome of 
previous bioattacks.  It provides an overall capabilities-based threat assessment afforded 
by these findings, and recommends adjustments in U.S. biodefense policy.  As stated, the 
chapter does not undertake a full policy analysis.  Rather, it comments on current policy 
that may require adjustment based on the actual risk assessed. 
                                                 
34 Leitenberg, “Bioterrorism Hyped.” 
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II. THE RAJNEESHEE CULT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Rajneeshee Cult employed a crude biological weapon and caused at least 751 
known illnesses and 45 hospitalizations in September of 1984.  Despite its tactical 
success in disseminating Salmonella typhimurium, the group failed to achieve its 
objective of obtaining control of the Wasco County, Oregon Commission by making a 
majority of the voting public sick on the day of elections.  The cult created local hysteria 
and saturated the public health system; however, accomplishing the attacks nearly five 
weeks before the local elections negated any affect it had on the voting public.   
The focus of this chapter is threefold.   First, it determines the fundamental 
capabilities which allowed the group to obtain, weaponize, and employ the agent S. 
typhimurium.   From these established capabilities, the chapter assesses tactical success or 
failure of the attacks and ascertains which capabilities directly affected the ensuing 
outcome.  Third, it establishes a basis for assessing today’s threat since the event was the 
first documented bioterrorism attack in the United States. 
Although the Rajneeshees accomplished the first U.S. attack and the earliest one 
of the three cases selected, its importance is grounded in several other reasons as 
compared to the other studies:  the covert nature of the attack, the use of a normally non-
lethal agent, the lack of attribution until the group’s leader came forward, and the large 
impact such an event had on local authorities even if that was not the objective.  The 
cult’s ability to carry out such an attack with these unique characteristics sheds light upon 
the nature of the BW threat.  If a group can cause major consequences despite limited 
capability without attribution or anyone even being aware a bioattack happened, the BW 
risk may be greater than expected.  In essence, this highlights the positive aspect of a 
capabilities-based assessment.  Being aware of a group’s ability in the BW realm or just 
knowing the general potential capability based upon agent, equipment, and technical 
expertise availability/capability, may prove to be indicative of the threat the government 
should prepare for. 
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The case also underscores the fallibility of a capabilities-based assessment as 
well.  In Chapter I, intent was described as something too intangible to assess effectively.  
This chapter illustrates that capability becomes equally difficult to gauge due to the dual-
use nature of biological manufacturing equipment and non-select agents, widespread 
technical expertise availability, and the quickly growing field of biotechnology and 
science.  Judging an individual terrorist group’s capability may be just as difficult as 
assessing intent.  Knowing this limitation, the government being aware of the overall 
capability within the field and how it is evolving may prove to be the preferred use of the 
capabilities-based assessment.  Additionally, this demonstrates that intent is necessary to 
evaluate threat, but capability must be looked at because without it, threat does not exist. 
To begin, this chapter develops the background of the Rajneeshee.  It then 
explores how the group arrived at the point of WMD employment as a terrorism tactic 
and introduces key personnel in the organization.  The analysis section investigates 
capabilities leading to tactical success in the three phases necessary for a biological 
terrorism attack:  obtaining or isolating a pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and 
employing the agent.  The chapter ends by discussing the basis for success or failure and 
summarizes the group’s baseline capabilities. This chapter is the first piece in a unique 
capabilities-based risk assessment of bioterrorism from non-state actors. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Organization 
Rajneesh Chandra Mohan founded a commune in Poona, India in 1974.35  Prior to 
this, he earned a masters degree and then instructed philosophy at the University of 
Jabalpur in Jabalpur, India.  Known by his most familiar name, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, 
he evolved into an Indian spiritual leader teaching a combination of Hinduism, Jainism, 
Buddhism, Taoism, and Christianity combined with many other practices of psychology 
and meditation.36 
                                                 
35 “Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh,” Oregon Biographies, The Oregon History Project.  The Oregon 
Historical Society.  http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/Oregon-Biographies-Bhagwan-Shree-
Rajneesh.cfm (accessed December 2006). 
36 “Osho, Formerly Known as Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh,” Religious Tolerance, Ontario Consultants 
on Religious Tolerance, http://www.religioustolerance.org/rajneesh.htm (accessed December 2006). 
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Rajneesh gathered a significant following due to his open views on spiritual and 
sexual freedom.  At one point, he nurtured over 200,000 followers in 600 meditation 
centers worldwide.  One of his most faithful followers, Ma Anand Sheela, urged 
Rajneesh to immigrate to the United States.  Finally due to heavy pressure from India’s 
government to leave the country, he abruptly moved the group to Montclair, NJ.  Sheela 
searched for a site throughout the country and finally settled on 65,000 acres called “Big 
Muddy Ranch” in rural eastern Oregon.37   
 In the small county of Wasco (population approximately 20,000 in the mid-
1980s), Rajneesh purchased the ranch just outside of the county seat of The Dalles, 
Oregon, for $5.75 million.38  Eventually, over 4,000 members settled within the 
completely self-contained commune.  The cult started on friendly terms with the local 
population in the county, but the group quickly turned negative and aggressive towards 
the public’s unenthusiastic reaction to its expansion and building violations.  Due to 
Rajneesh’s perceived threat to the commune from the local community, he enlisted 150 
cult members to carry weapons to defend the borders of his “town” from the outside 
world.39 
The commune cultivated negative feelings within the Wasco County community 
but not among the entire local populace.  A member of the planning commission during 
this time period, Dan Ericksen, said that although he personally did not like the 
Rajneeshees for many reasons, they brought hard-working and educated people to the 
area and spent $35 million building the ranch and its infrastructure.  The cult infused a 
great deal of money into the local economy.  Ericksen added that despite fairly generous 
local support, if the county commission challenged the cult on building or zoning issues, 
the commission members were verbally attacked and even threatened.40  Conflict 
between the local community and the commune appeared inevitable.  By 1984, the cult’s 
                                                 
37 “Osho (or Ranjeeshism),” The Religious Movements Homepage Project, University of Virginia, 
http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/rajneesh.html (accessed December 2006). 
38 Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William J. Broad, Germs:  Biological Weapons and 
America’s Secret War (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2001), 15. 
39 W. Seth Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” in Toxic Terror:  Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, 
MA:  MIT Press, 2000), 118. 
40 Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 17. 
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desire to change the county to their liking caused a clash of cultures that culminated in 
bioterrorist activity.  The months prior to the Wasco County elections of November 1984 
were the setting for these events. 
2. Fundamental Issues and Strategy 
The Rajneeshee cult’s fundamental problems were perceived undue interference 
by the Wasco County commission and the constraints imposed by the area zoning and 
land use restrictions.  To correct this and achieve the goal of preventing any external 
influences over cult affairs, their overall strategy was to win jurisdiction of the county 
commission via local political elections.41 
To accomplish this goal, the Rajneeshees devised and implemented many peculiar 
ideas.  In 1982, they moved into the neighboring town of Antelope, Oregon, having a 
population of only 75.  By physically outnumbering the town, the cult took over the 
Antelope town council giving them complete power over most aspects of the town’s 
governmental affairs.  For example, the Rajneeshees renamed the town Rajneesh.  It took 
control over the local schools while also converting the only local business into a 
vegetarian restaurant called “Zorba the Buddha.”42  These actions gave the cult control of 
the small town of Antelope but failed to solve their problems caused by the county. 
 Another strategy was to incorporate their small town located on the commune, 
named Rajneeshpuram, in order to work around the cult’s violations of Oregon’s land-use 
laws.43  This legally allowed Rajneesh to field his own police department called the 
“Peace Force” with approximately 60 policemen.  This police agency not only patrolled 
within the cult’s walls, but it legally had the right to police the county roads.  More 
strikingly, this permitted legal access to law enforcement training programs and crime 
data networks.  Although the Rajneeshee’s peace officers did have access to Oregon’s 
data, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) prohibited access to its National Crime 
Information Center database due to an ongoing civil-rights complaint investigation.  The  
 
 
                                                 
41 Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 122-123. 
42 Miller, Engelberg, Broad, Germs, 16. 
43 Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 119. 
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Wasco County locals repeatedly complained about Rajneeshee policemen stopping and 
harassing them on country roads around the commune, which ultimately spurred the 
federal investigations.44   
 In another strategic move, the Rajneeshee’s “Share-A-Home” program brought 
thousands of homeless individuals from around the United States to the commune and 
provided them a place to live.  The cult then sought to register these people to vote on its 
behalf in the upcoming elections.45  In a related matter, the Rajneeshees brainstormed 
moving cult members into The Dalles under false names to vote multiple times with 
aliases via absentee ballots.  The group decided against this due to the fear of being 
caught by investigators uncovering this illegal voter registration campaign.46 
 When none of the previous ideas achieved the objective for the Rajneeshees, the 
idea of making the Wasco County voting populace too sick to vote in the elections 
evolved.  The cult hoped to cause low voter turnout and outnumber the local voting 
population of the county thereby giving the Rajneeshees the ability to “legally” have their 
candidates win the elections.  The approximately 15,000 registered voters of Wasco 
County overwhelmed a commune numbering roughly 4,000 from a voting perspective.  
With low local voter turnout, the cult hypothesized it would have the numbers to vote for 
and elect the candidate(s) they supported during the elections.47  The cult would then 
have control of the county commission allowing complete jurisdiction over any property 
issues and other expansion ideas. 
 Bioterrorism became the primary strategy to achieve the goal of taking over the 
Wasco County commission.  This strategy combined with taking advantage of Oregon’s 
voter registration laws with the Share-A-Home program appeared to the cult to be a 
sufficient plan to achieve the goal.  To understand how this strategy came to realization, 
the leadership and those involved in the development of the strategy are reviewed next. 
 
                                                 
44 Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 16-17. 
45 Ibid, 17. 
46 Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 123. 
47 Ibid, 123-124. 
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3. Personnel 
Although Rajneesh himself was the true leader of the commune, he did not run 
the day-to-day affairs.  His private secretary, Sheela, primarily ran Rajneeshpuram since 
the group’s arrival in 1981.  Sheela, along with a handful of other high-ranking women 
who ran the commune, were called “Big Moms” and used the prefix of “Ma” in front of 
their names to denote this.  Beneath Ma Sheela, many supervisors called only “Moms” 
managed specific areas of the day-to-day operations at the ranch.  A third tier of cult 
leaders existed below the “Moms” who were considered advisors and closely tied to 
Sheela.48  In effect, this small group ran the cult while Rajneesh endured a four-year vow 
of public silence.49  Those working in his personal household disliked Ma Sheela, and in 
turn, she viewed them as a threat to her authority.  A second group also challenged her 
authority because they enjoyed direct access to Rajneesh because of their wealth and 
fame associated with ties to Hollywood.  A power struggle constantly existed about who 
had the power to accomplish tasks and how to carry out cult operations.50 
Ma Anand Puja ultimately spearheaded the biological weapons program for the 
cult.  Puja was a native of the Philippines with an American nursing background.  She 
had a close relationship with Sheela—the strong tie went back to their days together in 
Poona, India in the original commune.51  With these attributes, Puja supervised all 
medical operations at the commune.  She was the secretary-treasurer of the Rajneesh 
Medical Corporation (RMC) and managed the Pythagoras Clinic and the Pythagoras 
Pharmacy.52 
Many cult members disliked Puja, often referring to her as “Dr. Mengele,” 
associating her with Hitler’s horrific Nazi regime.  According to Ma Ava, a worker at the 
RMC Corporation during this time-frame, “Puja was feared and disliked by personnel at 
the RMC.  Puja behaved as a tyrant.”53  She is also described as being a loner and highly 
                                                 
48 Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 119-120. 
49 Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs, 23. 
50 Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 120. 
51 Miller, Engelberg, and Germs, 26. 
52 Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 121. 
53 Ava Kay Avalos interrogation, transcribed October 22, 1985, Oregon Attorney General’s Office, 3, 
cited in Carus, “The Rajneeshees,” 121. 
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interested in death and poisons.54  Puja was a dark soul with poor social skills and 
perhaps latent evil intentions—exacerbated by her access to Sheela. 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Obtaining the Pathogens 
The Rajneeshee cult chose to obtain pathogens legally from culture collections.  It 
either lacked capability to naturally isolate pathogens or decided not to attempt it.  Puja 
showed interest in several types of biological agents but eventually settled on only one at 
least initially.  These agents included the following:   
• Salmonella typhi (causes typhoid fever) 
• Salmonella typhimurium (causes common salmonella poisoning) 
• Salmonella partyphi (similar bacterium to S. typhimurium) 
• Francisella tularensis (causes tularemia—an agent of Cold War 
bioresearch) 
• Enterobacter cloacae (causes a large array of infections in almost any part 
of the body with high mortality rates but not in normally healthy people) 
• Neisseria gonorrhoeae (causes the sexually transmitted disease gonorrhea) 
• Shigella dysenteriae (causes very severe dysentery and possibly death) 
• Human Immunodeficiency Virus (causes Autoimmune Deficiency 
Syndrome—AIDs)55 
Initially, she desired S. typhi to cause typhoid in the local populace; however, 
there was concern over attribution of such an attack to the cult.  Instead, Puja chose S. 
typhimurium, causing common salmonella-type food poisoning in the local residents.56  
The cult ordered the bacteria legally through the RMC (as it was a state-licensed medical 
firm) from a Seattle-based company called VWR Scientific.57 
S. typhimurium causes salmonellosis.  This infection triggers diarrhea, fever, and 
abdominal cramps that last anywhere from four to seven days.  Usually, people do not 
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require hospitalization unless they become severely dehydrated or the illness spreads out 
of the intestines.  Once out of the intestines, antibiotics are required.58 
The cult contemplated and ordered more hazardous pathogens than S. 
typhimurium.  An invoice from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) proved 
the Rajneeshees ordered and received delivery of agents causing typhoid fever, tularemia, 
and shigella dysentery.  All are extremely dangerous bacteria that no doubt could have 
caused more casualties and even fatalities than S. typhimurium or if used in separate 
attacks.  Authorities failed to find samples of these bacteria at the clinical laboratories; 
however, the criminal investigation discovering the invoice did not take place until a year 
after the salmonella attacks, giving those associated with the events many opportunities 
to dispose of the evidence.  When discovered, these invoices were not shown to public 
health workers who would have realized their importance as a public health threat.59   
Puja also became extremely interested in the HIV virus which causes AIDS; 
however, very little information exists concerning isolating or obtaining the virus.  No 
evidence exists of the group obtaining HIV from any other source so the assumption is 
that they isolated the virus naturally from a human carrier if at all.60 
It appears the cult came very close and had the capability to carry out larger and 
much more devastating bioattacks based solely on the ability to obtain deadly pathogens.  
The ease in acquiring agents through legal means is striking in this case.  U.S. regulations 
have tightened since this event and once again post-9/11.61  Despite this, it demonstrates 
that someone with legal access to pathogens through a state-licensed medical firm or 
working with them in a laboratory setting has good opportunity to acquire them for future 
BW employment.  Ability to weaponize the agent proved no different as shown below. 
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2. Weaponizing the Agent 
The S. typhimurium samples arrived at the Rajneeshee laboratories in bactrol 
disks.  Members extracted them from the disks to prepare multiple cultures for 
weaponization.62  The production of this agent occurred in a laboratory called the 
“Chinese Laundry” initially and later moved to a more discreet location called the Allan 
Watts complex.  The lab setting was two A-frame buildings connected by a bathroom.  It 
contained an oversized freeze dryer and an incubator the size of a small refrigerator along 
with other associated equipment.63  These secret laboratories cultivated significant 
amounts of the salmonella for use in later terrorist operations.  This was not only 
confirmed by interviews of some of the people involved, but Oregon State and FBI 
investigators obtained open containers of the same salmonella strain used in the attacks 
from those laboratories during ensuing investigations.64 
Puja relied upon the expertise of Parambodhi, a laboratory technician, to culture 
the salmonella in larger quantities.  The technician manufactured it in liquid form that 
later could be spread with droppers or syringes on objects such as door handles and in 
food containers.65  It was a rudimentary method to produce a weapon yet its simplicity 
made overcoming the weaponization obstacle possible. 
The cult undoubtedly obtained the necessary laboratory equipment and pulled the 
technical expertise from an ordinary laboratory technician for suitable production of a 
biological weapon.  The liquid was easily and presumably safely transported in glass jars 
or vials for storage and eventual dissemination (no reports of cult members becoming ill 
during weaponization exist).  Although no estimates were made on the cost to weaponize 
this material, it probably was minimal with the cult’s clinics, laboratory, and RMC 
paying for items that were already necessary in those hospital settings. 
With respect to the HIV virus, the cult purchased a quick-freeze dryer in 
September of 1984 because her technicians informed her that they lacked the equipment 
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necessary to culture the virus.66  They obtained the necessary equipment, and Puja had 
the intent to work with the virus; however, the lack of further testing and moving forward 
with only S. typhimurium suggests capability did not exist to weaponize such a virus. 
Puja and her team displayed capability in obtaining salmonella and other even 
more dangerous pathogens and then exhibited the ability to weaponize as well.  While no 
evidence exists that other similar agents were cultured (such as S. typhi causing typhoid), 
the cult maintained the fundamental capability to produce significant amounts of bacteria 
similar to S. typhimurium.  Based on the abilities of obtaining and now producing 
dangerous pathogens, the cult held a dangerous capability for bioterrorism up to this point 
in the process. 
Compounding this capability is the ease in producing the weapon and the apparent 
availability of the equipment necessary to produce it.  Someone with the education and 
experience of a medical technician produced the weapon for Puja.  The literature does not 
indicate any extraneous equipment being purchased to augment the standard equipment 
available to a state-licensed medical laboratory.  The two characteristics perhaps elevate 
the concern about capability displayed in this case and may affect the level of threat 
assessed. 
3. Employing the Biological Weapon 
The cult’s Salmonella attack operations fell into two phases.  In the first phase, a 
year prior to the large-scale attacks, the cult allegedly poisoned two members of the 
county commission, Judge William Hulse and Ray Matthew, with an unknown agent in 
their drinking water that was believed to be S. typhimurium.  The event made both 
individuals severely ill with salmonellosis-type effects, forcing one to be hospitalized 
with nearly fatal effects.67  This appears to be a test run to determine the effectiveness 
and/or virulence of the weapon. 
Prior to the two waves of the second phase, several members of the cult affiliated 
with Puja assessed targets and attempted larger trials to determine if the liquid salmonella 
would sicken anyone else.  Sometime in July or August of 1984, while selecting targets, 
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Puja and others stopped at an Albertson’s supermarket and contaminated lettuce by 
pouring salmonella liquid over it.  Reportedly, someone put the agent on Wasco County 
courthouse urinal handles and doorknobs as well; however, no one reported becoming ill 
from any of these trials.68 
The two primary waves occurred nearly simultaneously.  The first wave was 
September 11-18, 1984, while the second wave followed from September 19-27, 1984.69  
The data from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) determined the sickness developed 
from ten restaurants (most in the earlier September wave).70  From eyewitness testimony, 
Rajneeshees members armed with multiple vials of salmonella employed it by discreetly 
pouring the solution into salad bar bowls, salad dressings bottles, and coffee creamer 
containers in those ten restaurants.71 
The cult succeeded with tactically employing the S. typhimurium bioweapon as 
clearly shown by the outbreak of salmonellosis infecting at least 751 individuals.72  Of 
those, at least 45 were hospitalized with no known deaths.73  Due to the location of the 
town on a major highway and a large number of restaurants to support transients, these 
numbers are assumed low because of the number of out-of-town travelers passing 
through.  It is also possible many illnesses went unreported due to the lack of media 
coverage beyond the immediate area. 
Puja chose a simple pathogen that is highly infectious because no natural 
immunity exists, but most contamination occurs from uncooked foods and lack of hand 
washing—not human to human contact.  The CDC estimates over 40,000 cases are 
reported annually in the United States alone, and that number is probably low due to 
under-reporting and lack of diagnosis.  It causes great nuisance and a large 
epidemiological response when outbreaks happen, but it will not cause large mortality 
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rates.74  For the cult’s strategy, S. typhimurium was a solid choice but other pathogens 
may have been better.  The salmonella bacterium lacks the virulence to kill most 
individuals unless they possess weak immune systems such as young children or the 
elderly.  The CDC estimates that only 600 people die annually from salmonellosis.  
Additionally, it is not highly contagious from person to person contact.  Choosing S. typhi 
like Puja originally desired most likely would have caused numerous fatalities and 
possibly larger total casualties. 
In terms of employment of the HIV virus, information is lacking in the literature.  
Apparently, Puja was extremely secretive with respect to this part of her biological 
programs.  Unconfirmed reports state that she did attempt to infect at least one individual 
with the virus; however, it is unknown whether that test was successful.75  With limited 
information about whether or not she even weaponized the virus, it is doubtful the 
capability even existed.  If it did, the capability was not in any form of wide dispersal.  
Rather, it involved an injection into a single target. 
From a capability perspective, the cult effectively disseminated a crude biological 
weapon to cause salmonellosis.  The agent can and did survive in the dissemination 
environment.  As shown by the tens of thousands of natural occurrences of salmonellosis 
each year, its presence is persistent on anything uncooked after contamination.  Viable 
protection for those disseminating the weapon existed for S. typhimurium as well.  As 
long as the individuals disseminating it minimized contact with the solution, did not eat 
any contaminated foods, and thoroughly washed their hands after employment of the 
weapon, they were virtually safe from sickness.  If by chance they became ill, as 
described earlier, the infection is usually non-life threatening to the average healthy adult. 
D. CONCLUSION 
1. Reasons for Program Termination 
Testimony from cult members leads to the conclusion that the attack ended for 
two possible reasons.  First, it was a test run determining the possibility of future success  
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in making enough people sick in the actual attack.  Second, the Share-A-Home program 
became too time-intensive to manage, requiring the leadership’s full and undivided 
attention.76 
If it was a test run, it was a success based on the escalation in casualties over 
previous trials—the cult actually made the local populace ill with this attack. This success 
begs the question of why the cult then failed to further employ BW as a tactic.  Despite 
this success, the cult possibly viewed their objective in the November 1984 elections to 
be unachievable due to smaller than desired casualties or the failure of the 
complementary program in the strategy—Share-A-Home.  Instead of continuing on with 
bioterrorism in conjunction with the Share-A-Home program, the group discarded both 
tactics to try other forms of terrorism to achieve their goals.77  The group made a decision 
to terminate the BW program to move on to other strategies.  Capability did not hinder 
future BW success rather other reasons forced the decision for early termination of the 
program.  If the Share-A-Home program became unmanageable due to its size and scope, 
a decision to focus cult leadership on it becomes a viable reason to self-impose a stop to 
BW development and employment. 
The perception of less success than expected, due to lower casualties than desired, 
and whether or not the cult achieved its objective are irrelevant for this thesis.  However, 
the possibility of perceived failure in this context becomes a capabilities-based failure to 
the cult because it believed itself incapable of producing enough casualties to 
satisfactorily affect their objective.  If this is the case, it sheds insight into the relationship 
between capability and tactical success.  Just because a group tactically employs a 
weapon successfully (displaying capability) does not mean they perceive it as a success.  
Expeditious epidemiological response by the local authorities in conjunction with state 
and federal assistance may have been enough to counter the Rajneeshees demonstrated 
capability—enough to make them terminate the program on its own.  This does not 
change the fact that the group achieved tactical success in employing a weapon or 
demonstrated dangerous capability.  Instead, it reveals a potential area for biodefense 
focus. 
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2. Capabilities Assessment 
The Rajneeshees demonstrated significant capability in their biological weapons 
program.  The group made large strides in the complex areas of obtaining pathogens, 
weaponizing them, and effectively employing the weapon.  They obtained simpler 
pathogens such as salmonella as well as more dangerous ones such as typhoid.  Reasons 
for initially using salmonella versus typhoid or some other pathogen are not fully known 
except to say concern existed about attribution.  The Rajneeshees overcame 
weaponization issues with salmonella and may have been able to mirror these procedures 
with the other bacteria obtained.  Finally, employment of the agent caused at least 751 
casualties.  The dissemination practices may have been rudimentary, but nonetheless, 
they were still effective.  From an overall perspective, Puja, her BW team, and the entire 
cult housed a tremendous capability.  That capability was not utilized to its full extent, 
but latent capability is capability nevertheless. 
The following chapter analyzes a second successful but much more recent case of 
BW employment—the U.S. anthrax attacks of 2001.  The explanations for success and 
summary of capability illustrated in the attack will build upon the findings of this chapter.  
When combined with the results of the failed attacks by Aum Shinrikyo in Chapter IV, a 
comprehensive listing of capability will be available with which to draw conclusions on 
the overall threat and make recommendations to U.S. biodefense policy. 
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III. U.S. POSTAL SYSTEM ANTHRAX ATTACK OF 2001 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With only one-half teaspoon of weaponized anthrax per letter, the perpetrator of 
the 2001 United States Postal System (USPS) anthrax attacks unleashed approximately 
20 billion spores in each.  Since the number of spores to infect 50 percent of the exposed 
population (termed ID50) is estimated at 8,000 to 15,000 spores, the potential lethality of 
this attack was considerable.  The costs of the attack were 22 known infected, 5 of which 
succumbed to inhalation anthrax, and a projected $6 billion plus price tag to clean up 
contaminated facilities and execute the ongoing investigation.  A simple dispersal 
technique via the mail system was not anticipated to yield such an effect prior to this 
attack.  Although the person or persons behind the attacks are still unknown, much can be 
learned from these circumstances. 
The focus of this chapter is threefold.  First, it determines the fundamental 
capabilities which allowed the person or group to obtain, weaponize, and employ the 
agent Bacillus anthracis.  From these established capabilities, the chapter next assesses 
tactical success or failure of the attacks and ascertains which capabilities directly affected 
the ensuing outcome.  Third, it builds upon the baseline capabilities established in 
Chapter I about the ability necessary to perpetrate such an attack.  This chapter is the 
second piece in a capabilities-based risk assessment of bioterrorism from non-state actors.  
It adds to the results from Chapter II and when combined with the findings in Chapter IV, 
a comprehensive list of BW capabilities is presented along with a bioterrorism threat 
level assessment and subsequent recommendations to thwart the risk. 
The importance of this particular study lies in three key areas.  First, the lack of 
attribution in this case stands out as a major facet of the attack.  To date, the FBI has not 
attributed the attack to any group or person despite an extensive search.  Second, it is the 
first attack in which a terrorist has employed a dangerous select agent.  The ability of the 
perpetrator(s) to carry out an attack with such a hazardous agent is very unique, 
especially when doing it without attribution.  Finally, government concern over anthrax 
has been with dispersal in aerosolized form over sizeable regions causing substantial 
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casualties.  In this case, a rudimentary employment technique caused relatively few 
casualties; however, it exposed an estimated 10,000 people to the bacterium, caused 
widespread panic, and saturated local and national authorities dealing with a relatively 
small attack. 
The group’s ability to carry out such an attack with all three characteristics sheds 
light upon the nature of the BW threat in two ways.  The most noticeable is the major 
decision to employ a select agent instead of a non-select agent—crossing a previously 
taboo line for terrorists.  Next, if a group can cause major consequences without 
attribution, the BW risk may again be greater than expected because the United States has 
no deterrent against it.  In essence, this highlights the positive aspect of a capabilities-
based assessment.  Just as in Chapter I, being aware of a group’s BW ability or perhaps 
just knowing the general capability groups are acquiring, may prove to be indicative of 
the threat the government should prepare for. 
The case also underscores the shortcomings of a capabilities-based assessment as 
well.  This chapter shows that capability becomes difficult to gauge due to the dual-use 
nature of biological manufacturing equipment, availability of anthrax (and other select 
agents) in many laboratories, availability of technical expertise, and the quickly growing 
field of biotechnology.  Judging an individual terrorist group’s capability proves difficult 
in this case as well.  However, if the government can determine overall capability within 
the field and generally how it is evolving, that may prove to be the preferred use of the 
capabilities-based assessment.  This case demonstrates that BW capability evolved from 
previous attacks.  Intent and vulnerability to attacks must be looked at to determine 
threat, but capability also must be reviewed because in this case it increased significantly 
in magnitude and possibly escalates the threat. 
The chapter begins by providing background information on the attacks and 
specifically the type of anthrax used.  It next offers theories on possible perpetrators of 
the incidents.  In similar fashion to Chapter II, the analysis section outlines capabilities 




attack:  obtaining or isolating a pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and employing the 
agent.  The study ends by outlining the key reasons leading to success or failure and then 
overall capability displayed in the attack. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Anthrax 
The disease anthrax is caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis.  It forms into 
spores that remain dormant and protected until environmental conditions allow it to 
become active to cause infection.  The disease is passable from person to person and 
exists in three types:  cutaneous (skin anthrax), gastrointestinal (digestive anthrax), and 
inhalation (lung anthrax).  Cutaneous anthrax is the least serious of the three with 
approximately 20 percent of untreated cases becoming fatal.  Gastrointestinal anthrax is 
more severe with 25 to 50 percent of the untreated cases being fatal.  Inhalation anthrax is 
the most critical and accounted for all 5 deaths of the 22 known infected individuals in 
the 2001 USPS attacks (45 percent of those diagnosed with inhalation anthrax).78  This 
type of anthrax left untreated is astonishingly fatal in over 90 percent of the cases.79   
After exposure to B. anthracis, symptoms appear anywhere from several days to 
over 40 days depending on the type, level of exposure, and the victim’s overall health.  
Normally, people are infected by physically handling contaminated items or breathing in 
enough anthrax spores off of infected items.80  In cutaneous anthrax, infection develops 
from direct contact with the skin (the skin does not have to be broken or cut based on the 
experience from this attack).  Gastrointestinal anthrax arises from ingesting anthrax 
infected meat—a very rare occurrence.  For the most critical inhalation anthrax, it 
requires inhaling spores one to five microns in size.  This makes them large enough to 
escape from being filtered by the nasal passages and upper respiratory tract yet they are 
still small enough to lodge deep in the lungs where they become active and infectious.  
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The ID50 number of spores necessary to infect someone with anthrax is about 8,000 to 
15,000 spores; however, based specifically on this attack, the minimum infectious dose is 
actually much lower depending on age and the victim’s overall health.  While the ID50 
number may appear large, the 2 grams of powder found in one letter contained 
approximately 20 billion spores.81  Even such a small amount of anthrax powder holds a 
devastatingly large number of spores. 
The catastrophic potential of the disease caused the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) to classify the agent as a Category A agent, meaning it poses one 
of the largest threats to society of known biological agents.82  For this reason and the 
survivability of anthrax in spore form, it is a prime candidate for weaponization. 
B. anthracis exists in 89 known strains.  The one utilized in this attack, the Ames 
strain, is named for the city in Iowa where it was initially isolated.83  Ames is naturally 
existing, extremely virulent, and surprisingly resistant to vaccines.  After the signing of 
the BTWC in the early 1970s, the United States utilized the strain to develop and test 
vaccines to thwart the biological weapons developed by the Soviet Union and other 
countries.  It is a dissimilar strain from Vollum 1B which the United States used in its 
offensive bioweapons program in the 1950s and 1960s.84 
2. Organization, Strategy, and Personnel 
Unlike the Rajneeshees case study in Chapter II, background of the group’s 
organization, strategy, and personnel cannot be entirely described due to the case’s 
unsolved nature.  Despite this, theories abound concerning the perpetrator(s).  According 
to the FBI website, they are looking for an adult male that may work in a laboratory and 
works easily with hazardous materials.  The individual probably has a scientific 
background or at least an intense fascination with science, and he possesses a solid source 
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for the anthrax.  He holds some expertise to weaponize anthrax to include the necessary 
equipment to accomplish it.  Finally, this person is non-confrontational, lacks personal 
skills, holds grudges—a loner.85  The FBI formulated this synopsis from that of the 
Unabomber profile.86  In July 2006, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Rutgers-
Newark in New Jersey, Leonard Cole, suggests that the FBI recently broadened their 
profile so as not to focus on such a narrow field of possible perpetrators; however, the 
FBI website as of September 2006 still reflects this description.87 
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Chair of the Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) 
working group on biological weapons, believes the individual to be an American scientist 
with access to anthrax or at least instructed to make it by an expert.88  She falls into what 
some call the “Bioevangelist” camp.  This faction believes an American scientist with 
experience in the realm of bioweapons thought the United States was failing to give the 
BW risk adequate attention.  The attacker demonstrated bioterrorism’s potential and 
blamed it on a large threat—Al Qaeda.89  The scientist brought attention to the problem, 
finally summoning sufficient assets to focus on the issue.  Others agree with Rosenberg. 
Randall Murch, former Deputy Assistant Director in Charge of Forensic Programs 
for all FBI labs, holds two theories on the anthrax attacks.  The perpetrator could be 
someone from outside the United States that sent the anthrax to a local terrorist to 
employ.  On the other hand, the terrorist may be a “homegrown” individual with the 
anthrax available to him due to his profession, and that person took advantage of the 9/11 
timing to employ it.  Murch gravitates towards his second theory which essentially aligns 
with Rosenberg’s views.90  He further believes that, “you don’t need much equipment or 
an advanced degree to make biological weapons.  You could fit all the stuff in a 
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garage.”91  Both he and Rosenberg agree that someone with access to anthrax in a 
government or affiliated civilian program retains the knowledge necessary to obtain the 
equipment to weaponize anthrax at a discreet location and employ it simply through the 
mail system.  Still others lean more towards Murch’s first theory. 
David Tell of the Weekly Standard is one of those individuals.  He argues that 
multiple details of the letters indicate foreign involvement.  Two examples include the 
use of all capital letters in the writing style (similar to languages like Arabic with no 
upper or lower cases) and that anyone familiar with anthrax would not at that time have 
prescribed penicillin for treatment of the disease.92  A more compelling argument arises 
from Richard Spertzel, a microbiologist who spent years at Fort Detrick, MD, where he 
worked on the U.S. offensive biological weapons program to include the anthrax 
program.  In addition, he was Head of Biological Weapons Inspections from 1994 to 
1998 for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) team surveying Iraq’s 
weapons program.93 
Spertzel testified to the House Committee on International Relations in December 
2001 that the anthrax, especially that of the Senators Daschle and Leahy letters, could 
only be produced by a group affiliated with either a current or former state weapons 
program.  He discounts any loner theory due to the complexity of the attack.  Spertzel 
believes this because, “the Senator Daschle letter contained anthrax that was more pure 
and concentrated than any found in the Soviet, U.S., or Iraqi biological programs.”94 
Spertzel noted the Iraqi program did not mill dried anthrax as in the Soviet or U.S. 
programs.  It used a one-step technique of “spray-drying” that produces the purity of 
anthrax found in the letters—the only known technique capable of doing so.  He 
advocates that somehow Iraq or a former Iraqi bioweapon scientist was involved.95  
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Spertzel told the Washington Post in late 2002 that he was one of only four to five 
individuals in the United States that could produce anthrax to the purity found in the 
senate letters, and he may need a year to manufacture it in a suitable laboratory setting.96 
Kenneth Alibek, former First Deputy Chief of the Civilian Branch of the Soviet 
Offensive Biological Weapons Program, takes a mixed perspective.  Having actually seen 
pictures of the anthrax, he stated in congressional testimony, “this agent and this product 
cannot be considered as a Russian or an American weapon.”97  He added that the 
perpetrator learned throughout the process because earlier batches were crude while later 
letters to Senators Daschle and Leahy contained much purer spores.  For these reasons, 
Alibek characterizes the terrorists as less than highly trained professionals; however, they 
were affiliated in some way to the biosciences.  The task necessitated some knowledge 
concerning the technology and production of anthrax to accomplish it.98 
Christos Tsonas, an emergency room physician at Holy Cross Hospital in Fort 
Lauderdale, FL, thinks he treated one of the 9/11 hijackers, Ahmed Ibrahim A. Haznawi, 
for cutaneous anthrax.  In June 2001, Haznawi presented himself at the emergency room 
for a large lesion on his leg.  Tsonas now believes that what he unknowingly treated with 
antibiotics was the skin form of anthrax.  A follow-up investigation by a group at the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies agrees with his assessment.99  
The FBI discounts the report because the type of lesion the hijacker had on his leg will 
never be known.  If the doctor’s information is accurate, it ties the 9/11 hijackers to the 
attacks causing the threat to then be considerable. 
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While these theories speculate on organization, strategy, and who the perpetrators 
may be, the large disparity in opinions illustrates that many experts believe the potential 
capability lies within numerous groups of varying backgrounds.  The question is how 
much capability does this person or group really hold with respect to obtaining, 
weaponizing, and employing anthrax? 
C. ANALYSIS 
Describing the methodology used by the perpetrator(s) to obtain the pathogen and 
to weaponize it is a complex issue.  Again, it is clouded by the lack of background in the 
case due to its unsolved nature.  Despite this, it is still worth analyzing both the 
methodologies because in the end, they illustrate capability to obtain anthrax and 
weaponize it to some degree. 
1. Obtaining the Pathogen 
By far, the largest user and distributor of the Ames strain was the United States 
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, 
MD.  It shared Ames in its pure, virulent form with the Chemical Defense Establishment 
at Porton Down in England (USAMRIID’s British equivalent).  It was passed to many 
other organizations, sometimes in its virulent form and other times genetically altered 
rendering the agent useless for weaponization.  The same group that supplied various 
cultures to the Rajneeshee cult in Chapter II, ATCC, provided anthrax strains to many 
places, including Iraq, in the late 1980s.  None of the known anthrax specimens sent to 
Iraq were labeled as the Ames strain.  Despite this, due to imprecise labeling procedures 
during those times, some believe the virulent form of Ames was sent unknowingly to 
several less than desired locations to include Iraq.100 
Over the years, many pathogens, to include this strain of anthrax, were shipped 
unquestioningly to a vast number of unidentified locations.  The availability of Ames 
worldwide is significant.  As described in Chapter I, the WFCC believes nearly 1,000 
germ banks to have improper security, and the Department of Health and Human 
Services reported in 2004 that severe lapses in control procedures for select agents 
existed at all 11 U.S. universities studied.  With the right contacts or placement in an 
organization affiliated with biosciences and technology, the capacity to gain access to 
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Ames or other dangerous pathogens is not beyond imagination.  An example of this eerily 
played out around the same timeframe as the U.S. anthrax attack. 
A microbiologist named Abdur Rauf worked for Al Qaeda in the late 1990s and 
into the new millennium.  In 1999, he reported in a hand-written note to Al Qaeda’s 
deputy commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, that he was able to effectively accomplish his 
goals.  In previous notes, he admitted to having setbacks acquiring B. anthracis in a 
virulent form and obtaining the necessary equipment but later reported unspecified 
success in achieving both goals.  Other notes comprised diagrams of makeshift 
laboratories and testing facilities, and another described a trip as a guest into a high-level 
biological containment lab where thousands of pathogens were stored.101  This thesis is 
not advocating that Al Qaeda committed the USPS anthrax attacks in 2001; however, this 
information clearly shows motivation and intent to obtain anthrax and the necessary 
equipment to weaponize it.  More importantly for this thesis, if the notes are true, it 
depicts capability or at least a heavy pursuit of that capability. 
The individual actually obtaining the anthrax for the U.S. attacks may be a 
homegrown scientist, someone who received help from a U.S. scientist, or someone from 
overseas obtaining the agent or helping with it.  The identity of the individual actually 
obtaining the anthrax does not matter from a capabilities standpoint.  It is more important 
to acknowledge the potential of a terrorist to obtain a dangerous pathogen due to his or 
hier personal access or contacts. 
2. Weaponizing the Agent 
According to Alibek, the anthrax was not from a former U.S. or Soviet offensive 
program partly seen by the manufacturing process.  Besides those programs using other 
strains, they also utilized the dry-milling process to grind the spores into a very fine 
powder that enhances dispersal.102  While Alibek alludes to the anthrax not being 
produced via the dry-milling method, his congressional testimony failed to provide an 
alternative theory.  In contrast, Spertzel provided a theory that the anthrax was produced 
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by the one-step process of dry-spraying because of its quality, something he believed Iraq 
was capable of accomplishing based on his weapons inspections in the early 1990s.103   
Adding to the debate on how the agent was manufactured, experts disagree on the 
quality of the anthrax in the last two recovered letters.  The quality of the anthrax in these 
letters was significantly better than that found in the first two; however, conflicting 
reports have appeared from different government groups.104  Alibek says the anthrax is 
not from a state-run weapons program due to the particle size inconsistencies; however, 
he does not discount that it is of decent quality.105  Others such as Spertzel, think it is of 
phenomenal purity.  David Franz, former head of the Army’s biodefense lab, believes it 
to be of a very concentrated, pure form with “no garbage” after seeing pictures of the 
anthrax spores.  He bases his characterization on the lack of spore coating to remove 
static electric charges—weapons-grade anthrax (meaning anthrax from state-sponsored 
programs) would be treated in this manner to increase floating and dispersal attributes.106  
In late September 2006, the FBI officially confirmed Franz’s theory that the powder did 
not have anything added to increase lethality.  It did not, however, downgrade the purity 
of the powder.  Instead, the FBI only clarified it was not weaponized to a state weapons 
program standard with anti-static additives.107 
Unlike the dispute over purity and manufacturing method, expert consensus 
officially states the anthrax was manufactured in the two years prior to the attack.  This 
indicates the perpetrator recently had ties to an ample laboratory setting sufficient to 
produce a decent grade of anthrax.  This finding refutes any idea that it was appropriated  
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from a lab sample from long ago.  Perhaps more strikingly, the discovery suggests that if 
the perpetrator was able to recently produce anthrax, a very real threat still remains 
today.108 
Although the attacker is unknown in this situation, one can assume several 
barriers previously thought insurmountable were overcome based upon the actual ability 
to weaponize the anthrax.  Producing the agent in whatever manner must be relatively 
economical.  If a large transnational terrorist group like Al Qaeda was involved, they may 
have had more monetary assets to facilitate such an attack.  Despite this, estimates put the 
cost to conduct the attack at anywhere from a few thousand to $50 thousand.109  Even at 
the higher end of the estimate, that cost is relatively low to organize and execute a 
terrorist attack.  In comparison, the 9/11 attacks created much greater devastation; 
however, they also cost nearly ten times the max estimate for the anthrax attacks at 
approximately $500 thousand.110 
Safety of those producing the anthrax and obtaining the necessary equipment are 
the other barriers thought too difficult to overcome.  While it is not known if the 
perpetrator(s) survived the employment phase of the attack, they at least stayed alive 
throughout the weaponization process long enough to employ it over a nearly two week 
timeframe.  Appropriating the essential safety equipment must have been simple enough 
to avoid detection by others and especially the authorities—most likely because of the 
equipment’s dual-use nature in laboratories.  Similarly, the ability to acquire the 
production equipment explains one of two scenarios.  First, the production method only 
requires simple and commonplace items that can be found in any laboratory making 
obtaining them easy.  Or, the required apparatus is very technical yet still obtainable from 
labs lacking appropriate security and accountability procedures.  In either scenario, the 
ability to acquire such equipment and manufacture it in a unique manner displays 
increased capability and relative ease in acquiring the capability. 
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In similar fashion to the debates over how the agent was obtained, BW experts 
continue to deliberate the quality or purity of the anthrax spores and its method of 
production.  Despite these unknowns, the evidence available provides valuable insight to 
capability.  First, a terrorist undoubtedly weaponized anthrax for dispersal; therefore, 
capability existed to some degree.  Second, the deliberation over purity and production 
implies either an ability exists to manufacture anthrax in ways unproven by the former 
U.S. and Soviet programs (such as the dry-spraying technique) or in completely new and 
unknown manner altogether.  A truly unique method to produce the anthrax may have 
been utilized.  Third, the fact that it was created sometime in the two years before the 
attacks indicates the capability was recently obtained, but more importantly, it probably 
still exists due to lack of attribution.  Finally, the probable ease in gaining the safety and 
production equipment possibly increases the threat beyond just the simple fact that 
someone actually obtained anthrax in the first place. 
3. Employing the Biological Weapon 
Before analyzing the BW employment in this case, initially reviewing the vast 
consequences of the attack speaks volumes towards success—tactically employing the 
weapon against a target regardless of outcome.  The attacks exposed approximately 
10,000 people to the anthrax spores as ultimately determined by the CDC.111  Between 
October 2 and November 20, 2001, the CDC identified 22 cases of anthrax from those 
exposed.  Eleven cases were inhalational anthrax and the remaining cases were identified 
as cutaneous anthrax.  All 5 deaths occurred from the group of 11 inhalational anthrax 
patients.112 
The exposure of 10,000 people to anthrax spores dictated the use of strong 
antibiotics on those individuals; the CDC identified them for a strict 60-day regimen.  
Estimates put an additional 20,000 people using a variety of antibiotics as a precautionary 
measure.113  The widespread fear and panic caused by the government and especially the 
media being targeted brought about the over-use of these drugs.  While most terrorist 
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attacks happen instantaneously, this attack lasted for over a month and made people 
everywhere uneasy about opening their mail for a long time thereafter. 
The economic impact of the anthrax attacks is extremely large and will probably 
never be fully accounted for due to the complexity of the situation.  A General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report states that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
confirmed over 60 locations were contaminated with anthrax.114  The FBI and laboratory 
testing centers have spent untold millions on the investigation alone.  Cole estimates the 
total expenditure to be in excess of $6 billion dollars to decontaminate facilities and 
conduct the investigation to date.115 
Approximately 2,000 CDC employees worked full-time on the case and nearly all 
of their 8,500 employees contributed in some way.116  Tasking nearly one quarter of the 
agency’s employees to work this terrorist attack inevitably impacted other programs with 
which those workers were associated.  The monetary cost of antibiotics for those 
exposed, while probably quite large, is dwarfed next to the amount spent by the 
thousands estimated to have unnecessarily obtained and taken antibiotics during the 
attack timeframe.  The overall economic impact of the attacks is astonishing—estimates 
put the economic losses at an additional $1 billion.117 
Hoaxes became another facet of the economic impact of the attacks.  In just the 
first two months following the initial attack, the FBI responded to thousands of 
suspicious letters.  The number of man-hours spent tracking hoaxes instead of working 
the actual investigation (or others) had to enormously impact operations.118  The cost of 
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the FBI and other organizations tracking hoaxes combined with those individuals being 
pulled away from the actual investigation is staggering. 
The perpetrator(s) unquestioningly obtained and in some way weaponized the 
anthrax.  They inflicted devastating consequences upon the entire nation from sickness, to 
death, to large economic losses, to large government clean-up expenses, and finally to 
marring the American psyche.  How did the terrorists achieve these widespread “weapon 
of mass effect” types of results? 
Although the FBI only recovered four letters during the ensuing investigation, 
experts hypothesize that seven letters were probably sent laden with anthrax to various 
locations.  On September 18, 2001, almost certainly the initial five letters were sent from 
a mailbox in Trenton, NJ.  Subsequently on October 9, 2001, the terrorists sent the final 
two anthrax letters from the same mailbox location.119  Figure 1 depicts the trail of letters 
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Figure 2.   Cases of Anthrax with Paths of Envelopes and Intended Target Sites.  
 
NY, New York; NBC, National Broadcasting Company; AMI, American Media Inc.; 
USPS, United States Postal Service; CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System. *Envelope 
addressed to Senator Leahy, found unopened on November 16, 2001, in a barrel of 
unopened mail sent to Capitol Hill; **dotted line indicates intended path of envelope 
addressed to Senator Leahy.120 
 
All recovered letters are indisputably from the identical source.121  Although a 
group may have perpetrated the attack, the letters were all prepared by a single writer as 
determined by the same writing style and similar messages within the letters.  An FBI 
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linguistic assessment confirms with nearly 100 percent certainty that they were produced 
by the same individual.122 
Each letter contained roughly two grams or one-half teaspoon of dry powder 
anthrax based on those actually recovered.123  The letters exposed people and 
contaminated facilities through two methods.  The primary method dispersed anthrax 
spores when the letters were opened.  The actions of tearing open the envelopes and 
possibly removing the contents agitated the powder allowing it spill and become 
airborne.  All victims developed symptoms of either inhalation or cutaneous anthrax so 
the spores either settled onto their skin or were inhaled in large enough amounts to cause 
infection.  This is a rudimentary employment tactic that would normally not make many 
sick; however, since the CDC identified over 10,000 people for exposure, in theory, it 
had the potential of still making sizeable numbers ill if not recognized fairly quickly by 
the public health system. 
Just weeks before the actual attacks, a study published results of testing 
concerning envelope contamination with anthrax.  The study used Bacillus globigii 
spores (a similar but non-virulent form of B. anthracis) to test the dissemination 
characteristics of aerosolized anthrax when a contaminated letter is opened.  The results 
of the study staggered experts.  With an envelope containing only 0.1 grams of dried 
anthrax, the individual opening a letter could inhale nearly 500 times the LD50 amount of 
spores within 10 minutes.  The subsequent aerosol spread so rapidly that others within a 
room would also inhale lethal doses.124 
The secondary method of dispersal was unanticipated by most experts and 
probably caused unintended and/or unforeseen contamination in the attack.  Direct 
contamination and subsequent cross-contamination caused substantial damage via the 
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postal sorting process.  The mail system proved to be more efficient and lethal than 
formerly believed in spreading an agent such as anthrax and compounding its effects.   
The B. globigii postal study reported that if envelopes carrying the anthrax spores 
were not perfectly sealed, those working in the mail systems became exposed due to the 
compression of mail through the processing machines.125  Even more striking was 
research about spores seeping through microscopic envelope pores.  Another study found 
that thousands of pores exist in envelopes allowing one to five micron diameter particles 
to pass through its walls.  The analysis further suggested that compression from mail 
processing equipment would increase the flow of spores out of an envelope through these 
pores.126  This crude dissemination technique sickened and killed postal workers, 
contaminated dozens of postal facilities, and cross-contaminated other pieces of mail 
causing people to contract anthrax whose mail flowed through the sorting equipment at 
similar times as the terrorist letters.  The attack demonstrates the fundamental capability 
present when a group obtains and weaponizes a pathogen.  Even crude or rudimentary 
techniques can cause mass effects.  Military-style dissemination techniques utilizing 
aerosolized anthrax are not required to greatly affect an area. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The perpetrator(s) tactically succeeded in obtaining, weaponizing, and employing 
anthrax.  Terrorists in this case displayed noteworthy capability in their biological 
weapons program in all three areas.  Although the specific details are unknown about 
how they obtained or weaponized the anthrax, the group made great strides just from the 
plain fact they obtained and weaponized a select agent.  Previously, this has not been 
knowingly accomplished by any person or group.  The terrorists employed the weapon in 
a very crude manner but yielded widespread effects with great impact on many aspects of 
society.  Did this signify success in the eye of the perpetrator(s)?  It will only be known 
when the FBI attributes the harm done to someone.  What matters and what can be said is 
that capability existed in all three areas to complete a BW attack with a very dangerous 
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agent.  Noteworthy as well is the apparent ease of gaining the pathogen and necessary 
equipment to manufacture the germ without attribution. 
In contrast to Chapters II and III, the following chapter analyzes a less successful 
attempt at BW employment by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.  The explanations for failure and 
summary of capability illustrated in the attack will build upon the findings of this and the 
previous chapter.  With all three chapter findings combined, a comprehensive listing of 
capability will be available with which to draw conclusions on the overall threat and 
make recommendations to U.S. biodefense policy. 
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IV. THE AUM SHINRIKYO CULT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On March 20, 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult unleashed a crude Sarin attack upon 
the Tokyo subway station leaving 12 people dead and thousands hospitalized.127  The 
group is infamous for this landmark terrorist attack.  Less known about the cult is their 
fascination with and heavy investment in biological weapons.  Chemical warfare agents 
such as Sarin were actually a secondary weapon of choice to bring about its destructive 
goals.  Biological warfare agents were the group’s first choice until they delivered less 
success than anticipated. 
This chapter examines three issues.   First, it answers how the group obtained, 
weaponized, and employed the BW agents Bacillus anthrax and Clostridium botulinum.  
Next, the chapter assesses the tactical performance of the attacks and ascertains which of 
the established capabilities directly affected the outcome.  Finally, it builds upon the 
findings in the previous two chapters helping to consolidate a list of basic capabilities 
necessary to conduct a BW attack.  This chapter is the final component of the 
capabilities-based risk assessment of bioterrorism by non-state actors.  When the findings 
of all three case studies are synthesized in Chapter V, an extensive list of current BW 
capabilities is presented as well as a bioterrorism threat assessment and proposed changes 
to biodefense policy to hinder that threat. 
The fundamental importance of this case study is in its outcome.  It is the one case 
that is more failure than success in the use of BW.  Despite this, the case still 
demonstrates that a large BW capability existed within the cult.  Although failure may 
occur, capability issues may not be the paramount obstacle to overcome.  A group’s 
abilities may still be significant with other explanations causing failure. 
As was observed in the previous two chapters, this case underscores the weakness 
in a capabilities-only risk assessment.  Primarily, it shows the difficulty to assess a 
group’s capability due to the dual-use nature of biological manufacturing equipment and 
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non-select agents, widespread technical expertise availability, and the quickly growing 
field of biotechnology and science.  The chapter may provide even more support to 
utilize a capabilities-based risk assessment from a broad perspective—judging overall 
capability possible by groups today in the three areas of BW development—rather than 
specifically against each and every terrorist group.  Finally, the study emphasizes that 
because capability is so vital in determining the threat, it is imperative for authorities to 
be able to determine it in the future.  This group displayed significant capability that may 
have been utilized in more devastating ways had the circumstances been different. 
To begin the study, the chapter develops the background of the Aum Shinrikyo 
cult.  It reviews how the group chose to implement a WMD program and then introduces 
key personnel.  The study next analyzes capabilities leading to the outcomes within the 
three phases necessary for a biological terrorism attack:  obtaining or isolating a 
pathogen, weaponizing the agent, and employing it.  The chapter ends by reviewing 
reasons for the cult’s termination of its BW program, and it provides a summary of 
capability presented by the case. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Organization 
A psychopath named Chizuo Matsumoto founded the Aum Shinrikyo cult.  Born 
in 1955 on the Japanese island of Kyushu, he was the fourth son of a poor family of mat 
weavers.128  He was afflicted with infantile glaucoma causing blindness in one eye and 
partial blindness in the other.  After being sent to a boarding school for the blind, 
Matsumoto took advantage of his partial sight to adversely influence the other fully blind 
students.  He exhibited aggressive and ambitious behavior very early on in life.129  By the 
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time he graduated from high school in 1975, he defrauded his classmates of 
approximately $3,000 and gained their respect but only through the use of fear.130 
Throughout his childhood and into young adulthood, Matsumoto desired to be a 
leader, but his school peers and society bypassed him nearly every time.  He ran for 
student-body president occasionally from his elementary to high school years but failed 
each time to be elected.  Matsumoto aspired to be the prime minister of Japan after 
finishing high school so he sought to attend Tokyo University, the school for Japan’s 
privileged.  He failed the entrance exams and once again stymied his quest for leadership.  
Soon after this devastating failure he returned to Tokyo, Japan where he met his wife and 
quickly had their first of six children.  At this point Matsumoto began his journey towards 
leader of Aum Shinrikyo.131 
A religious void existed in Japan during the 1970s.  It stemmed from the 
dismantlement of State Shinto (government lead by a divine emperor) by the United 
States at the end of the Second World War.  Hundreds of new religions popped up to fill 
the hole during Japan’s economic boom in the 1970s.  While finally becoming a 
successful businessman earning significant money in the areas of yoga, acupuncture and 
the selling of fake herbal cures, Matsumoto became increasingly dissatisfied with his life 
and its purpose.  He also began searching for religion to help fill this emptiness.132  In 
1981, he joined a new religion called Agonshu.133  Despite its teachings, he became even 
more dissatisfied than before he joined.  In 1984, he broke away from Agonshu and 
formed a new company called Aum, Inc—a yoga school that marketed fake health drinks.  
He had not gained a spiritual awakening from his Agonshu experience, but Matsumoto 
now had a model of how to form his own cult and if nothing else capitalize monetarily  
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from that idea.134  By the mid-1980s, he recruited nearly 3,000 followers into the yoga 
school.135  He used his profits to expand the institution across Japan enabling him to 
bring in even more money. 
In 1985, Matsumoto officially changed his name to Shoko Asahara.  This identity 
change and self-perceived spiritual awakening evolved after two major events in his life:  
receiving a message from God while meditating on a beach and meeting a fanatical 
historian later that same year.  The message from God told him that he was chosen to lead 
God’s army.  Not knowing the full meaning of what God meant in his message at the 
time, the historian put the entire revelation into clear context.  He informed Asahara that 
Armageddon would arrive by the end of the millennium, only a godly group will survive 
it, and the leader of that group will emerge as the leader of Japan.   Based on this self-
perceived divine guidance combined with the historian’s “prophecy,” Asahara changed 
his name, grew out a beard, and began to wear clothing of a religious man.136  The 
change to a religious guru was almost complete.  There was no doubt, at least in his mind, 
that this was his calling. 
The pinnacle moment in his transformation to a religious leader was a meeting 
with the Dalai Lama in February 1987 in Dharmsala, India.  Asahara claimed the Dalai 
Lama asked him to spread Buddhism throughout Japan since he had the mind of a 
Buddha.  With this divine backing, Asahara believed he attained full enlightenment of his 
“religious powers” and set forth in working his company into a cult.  In the months 
following this visit, he changed his yoga school from Aum, Inc. to Aum Shinrikyo and 
began having his followers call him sonshi the Japanese word for guru.137    Asahara’s 
company officially evolved from yoga school to religious cult with him being the leader 
and guru. 
Asahara learned from previous experiences with Agonshu that apocalypse-type 
rhetoric brought in many followers to the group and therefore money.  He assembled the 
ideas of Armageddon from western religions, the apocalyptic prophecies of Nostradamus 
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from the 16th century, and Lord Shiva the Destroyer from Hinduism.  He capitalized 
financially by developing this conglomeration of doomsday material, prophecies, and 
cures that sold well to many cult members and others.138  By the mid-1990s, Aum 
Shinrikyo held 40,000 to 60,000 constituents and monetary assets in the realm of $1 
billion.139  It also had 20 major facilities in Japan while expanding to over 30 branches in 
6 countries, to include:  a trading company in Taiwan, a Sri Lankan tea company, an 
Australian sheep ranch, and research facilities in Yugoslavia.140 
2. Fundamental Issues 
The real story of Asahara, Aum Shinrikyo, and bioterrorism begins in 1989 with 
two issues:  the cult running for elections within Japan’s lower parliament and the 
Japanese government granting the group official religious status.141  The results of the 
political bid and status as a religious corporation respectively cause and enable Asahara 
to take a new route towards death and Armageddon via weapons of mass destruction. 
In the 1989 political campaign, 25 cult candidates to include Asahara lost 
miserably after spending nearly $7 million of the group’s money in bizarre campaigns.  
Asahara received only 1,783 of 500,000 votes in a district with 1,800 of his own cult 
followers.142  “Their failure, Asahara proclaimed, only confirmed how decrepit society 
had become and showed the need for more extreme solutions.  From here on, he would 
abandon trying to work within the system; he was now intent on destroying it.”143  This 
political disgrace greatly fueled Asahara in taking a tack towards death and destruction. 
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Japan’s 1947 Religious Corporation Law protected Asahara’s warped religion; 
therefore, the cult made official religious recognition a top priority.  The law hindered the 
Japanese government from investigating any type of religious doctrine or activities.  This 
was done to avert overzealousness or any state-affiliation to a religion as was the case 
during the former State Shinto government.144  Asahara would use this virtual free pass 
with the Japanese government to attempt to attain his final goal—destroy the system and 
bring about the Armageddon that he promised.  Further, he would be ready with his cult 
to lead the new Japanese government and possibly the world. 
Following the elections and armed with a certified government religious status, 
Asahara began writing and teaching of a coming Armageddon.  Although not a normal 
theme in Buddhism, Armageddon became a major one in Aum Shinrikyo.  The only way 
to salvation was through the cult.145  In his book Shivering Predictions by Shoko 
Asahara, he stated: 
From now until the year 2000, a series of violent phenomena filled with 
fear that are too difficult to describe will occur.  Japan will turn into a 
waste land as a result of a nuclear weapons attack.  This will occur from 
1996 through January 1998.  An alliance centering on the United States 
will attack Japan.  In large cities in Japan, only one-tenth of the population 
will be able to survive.”146 
Asahara continued to preach about Armageddon with variations in dates and 
story; however, the general theme of death and destruction in the late 1990s to early 
millennium did not change.  In order to facilitate his prophesized doom, he organized the 
cult to take control of the Japanese government when necessary, and he recruited bright 
individuals to facilitate the coming death and destruction through WMD programs. 
According to Rex Hudson, “Cults actively weed out the stupid and the psychiatric 
cases and look for people who are lonely, sad, between jobs or jilted.”147  Many of 
Asahara’s followers joined the cult to avoid or rebel against the over worked, corporate-
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centered lifestyle that caused devotion to one’s job to supersede virtually everything else 
in Japan’s culture.  Aum Shinrikyo attracted Japan’s elite in the fields of biology, 
engineering, chemistry, computers, and many other top professions.148  The cult targeted 
universities and those in dead-end careers, and it found thousands of sharp individuals 
looking for something more in life.  To understand the methods and goals used by 
Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo, a review of the key bright Japanese recruits/leaders is 
necessary to understand how they came to attempt bioterrorism attacks and perhaps why 
they were unsuccessful. 
3. Personnel 
Aum Shinrikyo mirrored its organizational structure to the Japanese government 
by establishing 24 ministries and agencies each with a devout cult member as its 
leader.149  When Armageddon eventually happened, the cult would be ready to step in 
and quickly assume the lead role in Japanese government.150  These ministers and agency 
heads formed the inner circle of Asahara’s trust—aware of and major participants in Aum 
Shinrikyo’s criminal behavior unlike the majority of the remaining organization.151  The 
key individuals to focus on with respect to bioterrorism incidents are the following:152 
• Minister of Science and Technology:  Hideo Murai 
• Minister of Healing:  Ikuo Hayashi 
• Minister of Health and Welfare:  Seiichi Endo 
The Minister of Science and Technology, Hideo Murai, was also considered the 
Minister of Distribution Supervision and the overall apocalypse engineer.  He graduated 
from Osaka University with a degree in Physics and soon thereafter earned a masters 
degree in Astrophysics.  Murai worked in Kobe Steel’s research and development section 
for two years and quit his career entirely to join Aum Shinrikyo in 1989.  He was directly 
involved in numerous violent incidents:  the murder of a lawyer and his family, the 
murder of at least one cult member, the Matsumoto Sarin attack that killed seven and 
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injured nearly 150 people, and the infamous Tokyo subway Sarin attack that killed 12 
and injured thousands.153  Murai was an intelligent individual holding a very technical 
educational background.  However, he had little work experience in his field and lacked 
the educational background or work experience in any field remotely related to bioagents 
or bioweapon development. Despite this, he was part of the group working on BW 
programs, and specifically one of the scientists making the decision to obtain certain 
pathogens.154   
The Minister of Healing, Ikuo Hayashi, managed the Aum Shinrikyo clinic in 
Tokyo.  He graduated from Keio University’s medical school and then studied at Mount 
Sinai Hospital in the United States.  He served for many years at a government hospital 
near Tokyo specializing in heart and circulatory system conditions.  Following a car 
accident where he nearly killed two people, Hayashi became downhearted and soon after 
joined Aum Shinrikyo.  After joining the group, his professional methodologies for 
treating patients changed.  “He told those under his care that their illnesses would never 
be cured through conventional means.  Instead, he prescribed a range of treatments that 
included drinking quarts of hot water, swallowing string, and jumping.”155  Due to 
hospital pressure about his unorthodox treatments, Hayashi resigned and moved his 
family onto an Aum Shinrikyo compound.156  Although Hayashi had the general medical 
training to be involved in a biological program, he again lacked the direct training or 
experience in these fields that perhaps even an uneducated technician might have that 
works directly with pathogens on a day-to-day basis.  Even if he had the sufficient 
educational or work background, he was also busy working as the Minister of Healing 
and running the clinic.  Hayashi was involved in the torture, drugging, and deaths of 
multiple individuals in addition to erasing the memories of 130 members via electric 
shock.  He also helped perpetrate the Tokyo subway Sarin attack.157 
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The Minister of Health and Welfare, Seiichi Endo, was considered the top BW 
specialist within Aum Shinrikyo.158  He was a graduate student prior to joining Aum 
Shinrikyo where he studied biology at Kyoto University and accomplished 
research/experiments in genetic engineering at the school’s Viral Research Center.  Endo 
researched and attempted to obtain and culture Clostridium botulinum and Bacillus 
anthracis for Aum Shinrikyo as the leader of the BW research teams.159  He was perhaps 
the one known individual with the technical ability that when combined with the 
laboratory resources provided by Aum Shinrikyo could possibly have cultured and 
prepared virulent bioagents; however, he was not a microbiologist and had limited work 
experience in the field. 
Asahara also assigned Endo to manufacture Sarin nerve gas which he produced in 
an impure form for the March 20, 1995 Tokyo subway attack.  He was directly involved 
in perpetrating both Sarin attacks in Matsumoto and Tokyo as well.160  These tasks 
effectively removed him from his work on biological weapons at that time. 
The remaining individuals that formed the ministry and agency heads (and 
Asahara’s inner circle) lacked the educational background and/or work experience to be 
of major impact in a bioweapons program.  In addition to the lack of necessary 
background for this kind of work, the cult’s mind control tactics possibly hampered the 
scientists’ and other workers’ abilities to produce better WMD of any type.  Numerous 
sources characterize Aum Shinrikyo followers, specifically those involved in WMD, as 
having studied at Japan’s best universities in technical degrees such as medicine, 
biochemistry, biology, etc.161  In actuality, not all members benefited from these 
backgrounds with many being poorly educated and working class.162   
Although Aum Shinrikyo recruited many educated individuals with advanced degrees, 
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they also gained numerous individuals with no technical background for BW work.  
Those signed up with advanced degrees were quite young and inexperienced in their 
fields.  Most had academic experience but little work experience in their respective fields 
let alone any experience as a microbiologist dealing with bioagents.  This contradictory 
view of Aum Shinrikyo’s elite is important and will be addressed later when looking at 
reasons for failure. 
The cult utilized a multitude of mind control techniques during initiation and 
throughout everyday life to hunt out spies, trick members into signing over their savings 
and properties, and keep general control of the masses.  In 1986, Aum Shinrikyo started a 
dual-track membership system.  “Ordained” members were required to donate all of their 
assets to include inheritances to the cult while “Lay” members were just “normal” or 
typical followers of the religion.  Fifty-six ordained members were reported as missing, 
and another 21 died in the cult’s clinic.163  Compelling members to submit in every way 
to the group was a high priority for Aum Shinrikyo, and many paid the ultimate price for 
lack of capitulation after discovering the evil nature of the cult. 
The group’s initiation process used “mind-altering drugs” to captivate outsiders 
and brainwashing techniques such as continual sleep-deprivation and isolation to control 
individuals already part of the cult.164  One former recruit reported being drugged by a 
hallucinogenic like LSD during initiation to be afforded a more religous experience to 
draw him deeper into the religion.  He was then not allowed to return home but instead 
confined to a monastery to devote his time to meditation.165  Drugs were used not only in 
initiations but in punishment as well.  As reported by an ex-member who successfully 
fled the cult in 1994, many members lost their minds due to continual drug-induced states 
and wandered aimlessly throughout the compounds not knowing who they were let alone 
what they were doing.166 
                                                 
163 Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why, 194. 
164 Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Global Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
165 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God:  The Global rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, 
CA:  University of California Press, 2003), 109. 
166 Bracket, Holy Terror, 97. 
59 
In a pamphlet called “The Vajrayana Vow,” Asahara borrowed from a Buddhist 
tantra but gave it his own new meaning.  He modified it to say, “followers were to empty 
themselves completely of their own selfhood so that they could be filled with the spirit of 
the guru.  Their only religious practice was to do whatever the guru instructed, and the 
guru was always right.”167  This tantra helped brainwash followers into believing murder 
and other atrocities were legal and justified if Asahara authorized them. 
Finally, Aum Shinrikyo utilized the mind-control techniques of food and sleep 
deprivation to keep members under control.  The exhaustive techniques made members 
more susceptible to Asahara’s bizarre teachings which came at them relentlessly.  These 
tactics coupled with seclusion and the cutting of ties with family virtually guaranteed 
complete devotion to the cult.168  All of these techniques fostered an environment that 
guaranteed followers did what their leaders desired and that whatever the leaders wanted 
was therefore acceptable. 
It is worthwhile noting that Aum Shinrikyo members by-and-large were innocent 
of the heinous crimes and terrorist attacks.  Asahara’s inner circle of agency heads and 
ministers not only planned the atrocities with him, but many times they personally 
ensured the preparations were complete and/or helped perpetrate the events.  Aum 
Shinrikyo leaders initially believed they were building these weapons in a defensive 
posture to survive the ravages of Armageddon when it happened.169  Asahara’s 
justification for the weapons unfortunately changed by the early 1990s.  He believed they 
needed to inflict attacks on society to bring about a war between the United States and 
Japan.  Following the 1993 attempted bioattacks, Asahara hoped to blame the U.S. 
government for the acts proving that his prophecy of a U.S. led attack on Japan had come 
true.170  While the group of followers aware of the BW program was small and their 
intentions initially defensive, Aum Shinrikyo turned sinister when Asahara’s intentions 
for the weapons were combined with a tight-knit group of mind-controlled leaders and 
devoted followers. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
1. Obtaining the Pathogens 
Aum Shinrikyo’s financial assets available to obtain and/or isolate pathogens 
were unrivaled.  Additionally, the cult’s clinic held official medical status which did 
allow them access to equipment and certain pathogens through legal means as was the 
case with the Rajneeshee cult.  With these two characteristics, the group maintained a 
strong ability to obtain pathogens.  Despite this, the group chose to naturally isolate 
Clostridium botulinum from the soil on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido and 
illegally acquire Bacillus anthracis from a local hospital.171 
The cult was destined for failure from the beginning with botulinum toxin (the 
toxin created from Clostridium botulinum).  It chose to work with a difficult agent to 
isolate naturally if unable to gain access to the bacterium from a germ collection.  
Knowing this difficulty, the group still continued to pursue the pathogen despite having 
to naturally isolate it.  According to Masaaki Sugishima of Asahi University’s School of 
Law, Aum Shinrikyo (specifically Seiichi Endo) failed to isolate Clostridium botulinum 
from the soil.172  Endo and the group fell short from the outset by choosing a difficult 
route to obtain a pathogen and being unable to isolate the bacterium from which the toxin 
would then be created.  Failure occurred due to incompetence in a complex procedure for 
any scientific group in the field of biology. 
In contrast, Aum Shinrikyo’s anthrax program took a slightly different course.  
Endo requested a cult member with a medical license to acquire Bacillus anthracis for the 
cult’s BW program.  Instead, Endo received a non-virulent vaccine form of anthrax—the 
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Sterne strain used in Japan to vaccinate animals.173  Evidence suggests that Endo realized 
he was working with a vaccine strain leading to the possible conclusion that he was 
obtaining it as a test case for the weaponization and dissemination process.174  One could 
surmise Endo had moral issue with WMD use and intentionally failed by utilizing the 
Sterne strain; however, given his involvement in the Sarin attacks and other crimes, that 
scenario seems implausible.  If nothing else, Aum Shinrikyo was methodical, taking 
years to develop WMD capabilities.  It displayed a track record of performing test runs 
prior to actual attacks.  The Matsumoto Sarin attack that killed seven and injured 
approximately 150 individuals was described by cult members as a test run for the 
eventual Tokyo subway Sarin attack that occurred nine months later.175   
While it is reported that Aum Shinrikyo attempted to obtain other dangerous 
pathogens such as Q fever and Ebola Virus, no evidence has been found of success in 
obtaining them.  The group desired to obtain and culture other bioagents, but it was 
unsuccessful in obtaining them in the first place.176  Contrary to their experience with 
Clostridium botulinum, the leaders knew they could not and did not obtain or isolate 
these other agents so no further progress was made towards using them in the BW 
program. 
Failure to obtain or isolate the desired pathogens spelled failure for the cult to 
tactically disseminate BW.  Despite failure in this area, reviewing the group’s ability to 
weaponize and employ speaks volumes towards actual and potential capability. 
2. Weaponizing the Agents 
The full ability of Aum Shinrikyo to weaponize anthrax and what it thought was 
botulinum toxin is not fully known.  Due to Japanese police authorities being unaware of 
the cult’s BW activities until well after the events took place, too much time elapsed 
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allowing for evidence to disappear.177  Enough evidence was visible to produce a picture 
of capability in the weaponization process. 
The cult’s monetary assets were more than sufficient to procure the required items 
for weaponization.  The group established an elaborate string of front companies to 
obtain laboratory and industrial equipment along with other necessities for safe 
production.  For example, Japanese authorities located 160 18-liter drums holding the 
substance Peptone which is used for culturing bacteria.  Normal university research 
laboratories only use one liter per year.178  During other investigations, the police also 
found a four-story laboratory still incomplete that housed an elaborate set-up including, 
“a clean room, a filtration system for removing contaminants, and an air lock.”179  The 
cult had the material and equipment necessary to produce vast amounts of BW that when 
combined with a new, well-equipped laboratory indicate a latent, untapped capability. 
Specifically in the case of anthrax, success in weaponizing the vaccine strain 
seems apparent.  Liquid solution was located and archived by authorities at the site of one 
attack.  When analyzed years later in 2001, the spores tested positive for the Sterne strain.  
No comment was made on the quality of the liquid solution collected (with regards to 
spore size), but it illustrates the fundamental ability to produce anthrax in some form in 
enough quantity for dissemination.180 
The agents selected by Aum Shinrikyo appear to have been economically feasible 
for production.  The necessary equipment to weaponize the agents was economically and 
physically feasible to obtain, and the whole process was safe, relatively speaking.  In 
contrast, the availability of technical expertise to weaponize the anthrax did not exist. 
The major player in development, Seiichi Endo, was not a microbiologist and had 
little work experience in the field.  As previously described, a heart specialist and 
physicist were the other prominent members of Asahara’s inner group that had any 
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background compatible to working with BW.  In reality, the true expertise needed from a 
microbiologist being on staff was lacking in this situation. 
Three additional factors contributed to problems in the weaponization process.  
First, the group’s leaders were educated individuals that may have been able to do the job 
correctly under the right circumstances.  Endo and others were instead heavily tasked 
with multiple duties and required to focus on various types of apocalyptic weapons as 
directed by Asahara—nuclear, chemical, biological, laser, and earthquake-inducing 
weapons.  As stated previously, Asahara tasked Endo to develop the Sarin for future 
attacks which effectively negated his ability to continue with BW development at that 
time.  Second, with the type of atmosphere present in the cult, it is not surprising the 
scientists encountered difficulties that they could not overcome (at least not quickly).  
The culture of frequent drug use, sleep and food deprivation, and incessant fear of 
retribution for lack of full committal to the cult possibly caused stress levels incompatible 
with good scientific procedure.181  Third, as the time grew nearer to Asahara’s personally 
prophesized Armageddon, he desired results quickly.  When one technique failed, he 
pushed for something new.  When BW failed multiple times, he switched the cult’s focus 
from BW agents to chemical ones immediately.182  These same themes become apparent 
during the employment stage. 
3. Employing Biological Weapons 
Aum Shinrikyo attempted seven biological attacks from 1990 to 1995.  Four were 
carried out with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin.183 
• April 1990:  Botulinum toxin attack 
• June 1993:  Botulinum toxin attack 
• June – July 1993:  Bacillus anthracis attacks (two separate events) 
• June – August 1993:  Bacillus anthracis attacks (two separate events) 
• March 15, 1995:  Botulinum toxin attack184 
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The first two attacks attempted to employ botulinum toxin against multiple 
targets.  The April 1990 attack was perpetrated from three trucks at multiple locations.  
The cult targeted Narita Airport, the Diet, the Imperial Palace, the headquarters of a rival 
religious organization, and two U.S. naval stations.  The trucks utilized sprayers that 
could be used as the trucks drove by the target locations.  The June 1993 attack was 
conducted with a sprayer from a car that could also be used as the vehicle passed the 
target.  Prince Naruhito’s wedding and its attendees were targeted this time.185 
The next four events involved the use of anthrax.  The June to July 1993 attacks 
sprayed the agent from a building owned by Aum Shinrikyo—its new headquarters in 
Tokyo.186  The attacks happened over a four day period from the roof of the eight-story 
building with a sprayer/fan device.187  The June to August 1993 attacks were both 
perpetrated from a truck equipped with a device that sprayed the target in passing.  The 
cult targeted the Japanese government legislature, the Imperial Palace, and the Tokyo 
Tower during two separate attacks.188 
The final attack happened on March 15, 1995 utilizing three briefcases modified 
with sprayers.  They were placed near the Kasumigaseki, Tokyo subway station.  The 
agent attempted to be employed was botulinum toxin.189 
The lack of physical effects on any person following all seven bioattacks indicates 
an absolute overall failure—tactical employment of a true biological weapon did not 
happen.  No confirmed deaths or even sicknesses arose from the attacks during or in the 
days following (to allow for the incubation period of anthrax as described in Chapter 
III).190  Aum Shinrikyo failed to employ BW but not necessarily due to a capability 
failure in the realm of employment.  The cult did succeed in employing a non-virulent 
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form of anthrax.  The overall reason for failure was the lack of obtaining a virulent strain 
of anthrax and failure to naturally isolate the bacterium Clostridium botulinum in the first 
place.  The remainder of the discussion in this section addresses the cult’s use of anthrax 
since the group actually obtained a strain of anthrax and brought that agent to fruition. 
Although details of all transportation and dissemination devices are unavailable, 
one can assume from the multiple vehicle spraying attacks that the BW agent created was 
transportable making for a more covert delivery.  Anthrax and botulinum toxin are both 
very persistent agents that if properly obtained and weaponized would have been 
excellent choices to create havoc in and around Tokyo.  Natural immunity does not exist 
for either weapon so even crude dissemination tactics could have made an impact on 
Japanese society.  This lack of natural immunity also played against the cult had they 
been employing virulent strains.  Safety of those individuals releasing the agents would 
have been in question.  Based on their crude employment techniques in the Sarin attacks, 
those cult members involved may have been infected by the weapons; however, unlike 
chemical weapons, it would not have interrupted the task due to the delayed onset of 
symptoms with biological agents. 
The main problem with employment of the weapons (even the non-virulent 
anthrax) evolved within the dissemination technique—specifically the sprayers.  The 
anthrax sprayers reportedly had clogging issues leading to less dispersion of the agent 
and most likely spore clumps exceeding the preferred one to five microns necessary to 
infect people efficiently.191  The attack from the roof of the cult’s headquarters in 
downtown Tokyo reportedly had these issues, but that attack in and of itself raises 
questions again about the use of anthrax as a test run versus being an actual attack. 
The two attacks taking place from its new headquarters building seem illogical 
with a pathogen such as anthrax, unless it is a non-lethal form such as the vaccine strain.  
To spray anthrax directly off the building would cause the entire external area of the 
building to be contaminated allowing no one to come and go freely without 
decontamination areas and protective suits.  In addition, it would have required special 
modifications to the heating/air conditioning units so that they would filter out the 
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pathogens and not pump them throughout the building.  Both factors seem to indicate that 
the vaccine strain of anthrax was for testing purposes based on their track record of test 
runs and location of the attack coming off the top of the cult’s own building.  With many 
issues stacking up against the cult’s tactical employment of BW, it still managed to pull 
together a rudimentary weapon—perhaps a very dangerous one had it actually been a 
different strain of anthrax. 
D. CONCLUSION 
1. Reasons for Program Termination 
The question becomes:  why did Aum Shinrikyo stop the BW development 
process?  Two main reasons stand out as catalysts for this change in course or perhaps 
just a delay in development.  First, due to the slow development process and failures by 
the bioweapons development team, Asahara became increasingly impatient for results.  
He wanted to change to something that was currently feasible—namely Sarin.192  
Second, the cult became aware of an impending raid by Japanese police in early 1995 
requiring them to utilize something that was already developed and proven—again 
Sarin.193  It appears that its bioweapons research and development may have been 
temporarily put on hold but not terminated completely.  During the raids following the 
Sarin attacks, Japanese police found the four-story laboratory still under construction 100 
miles north of its Mt. Fuji compound in Naganahora.  It was equipped with advanced 
systems for bioweapons development.194  Had the raids not happened, the level of 
success in BW development may have been much higher over time if uninterrupted. 
2. Capabilities Assessment 
Aum Shinrikyo failed from the outset with botulinum toxin by not isolating it 
appropriately from the soil.  The weaponization and employment that took place was 
futile based on this fact.  No capability was displayed with this agent; however, the cult’s 
experience with anthrax was different. 
Had the group obtained a virulent strain of anthrax, the phenomenal laboratory 
facilities most likely would have enabled it to produce significant amounts of a dangerous 
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liquid-form agent.  The cult successfully weaponized anthrax into a less than military-
grade quality.  When disseminated with the crude and malfunctioning sprayers, the non-
virulent anthrax was dispersed and physically captured by authorities to prove it. 
While capability issues arose in all three areas of BW development, it appears that 
in the case of anthrax, other issues hindered the group from achieving more success and 
possibly caused premature termination or at least postponement of the program.  Since 
Japanese authorities raided Aum Shinrikyo compounds following the unrelated Sarin 
attacks, the world will never know if more time would have enabled even greater success. 
The following chapter synthesizes a comprehensive list of capabilities displayed 
by the groups involved in the three case studies.  From this list, a capabilities-based threat 
assessment is presented along with caveats this information brings with it.  Finally, it 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The three cases all portrayed considerable capability regardless of success or 
failure in tactical deployment of a weapon.  Capability issues at times presented obstacles 
for the perpetrator(s) to overcome; however, other problems unrelated to capability 
ultimately caused some BW programs to be terminated.  In those cases, aptitude in the 
three areas necessary for successful BW employment may have been a continuing 
obstacle, but that will never be known due to other circumstances causing either 
postponement of the program or ultimately the demise of the group. 
This chapter begins by summarizing the capability revealed in the three case 
studies, and it identifies common abilities achieved among the perpetrators.  Based on the 
findings, the effectiveness of a capabilities-based approach to risk is reviewed and how it 
might best be utilized in determining threat.  An overall threat assessment is presented 
next, and biodefense policy recommendations in the areas of the nonproliferation regime, 
attribution, and future attack scenarios follow. 
A. SUMMARY OF CAPABILITIES 
1. Obtaining or Isolating Pathogens 
In all three cases, this step appears to be the cornerstone to some level of 
bioterrorism success.  All groups were able to weaponize and employ their weapons in 
some manner once able to obtain a pathogen.  No group ever proved to actually isolate 
any bacteria or viruses.  Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated that the ability to naturally isolate 
pathogens lays somewhere in the future for most terror groups due to the over-complexity 
of the task.  As biotechnology quickly advances, this ability may become more promising 
to the untrained microbiologist, but it attested to the unlikely possibility in these cases. 
Terrorist group capacity to gain access to dangerous pathogens is staggering.  
Both the Rajneeshees and Aum Shinrikyo enabled “legal” access to hazardous germs 
through their medical clinics, laboratories, and/or hospitals.  Although the initial source 
of anthrax for the 2001 attacks is unknown, the study illustrated how lax security and 
shipping protocols were pre-9/11, how numerous locations were shipped anthrax from the 
late 1970s to early 1990s, and how even in the years following the attacks in late 2001, 
70 
many U.S. universities’ lab security procedures were still insufficient.  Perhaps even 
more precarious are the vast number of germ banks worldwide and how thousands of 
them are considered deficient in security controls. 
In Aum Shinrikyo’s situation with anthrax, it is unknown whether the group 
intentionally obtained a non-virulent form to initially work with for testing and 
experimentation purposes, or if the individual tasked to steal the agent possibly made a 
mistake or developed cold feet in the process.  In any of these scenarios, the group still 
had legal access to obtain dangerous pathogens.  No matter how it came to be that Seiichi 
Endo ended up working with the Sterne strain, the fact still remains that the capability 
existed to obtain hazardous agents, and although the anthrax was virtually harmless, the 
group successfully weaponized and employed it to some degree of success.  This result 
again demonstrates the key to bioterrorism—obtaining a pathogen.  If one was obtained, 
groups were able to accomplish destructive acts. 
2. Weaponizing Agents 
Two of the three cases illustrated definitive capability to weaponize salmonella 
and anthrax.  The Rajneeshees produced liquefied salmonella in significant quantity to 
spread it throughout at least ten restaurants following minor test runs.  The anthrax 
perpetrator(s) manufactured the weapon in a unique dry-powder form.  The terrorist 
groups in these cases displayed two distinct methods of agent weaponization—capability 
is more than evident in both scenarios. 
The case of Aum Shinrikyo is slightly different.  If its weaponization of the non-
virulent Sterne strain of anthrax was a test run or just a mistake, the world will never 
know without a doubt whether or not the group could have weaponized a harmful strain.  
Despite this, the cult weaponized the harmless anthrax strain in liquefied form for use in 
sprayers.  Its ability to generate the weapon in this manner proved at least somewhat 
successful in that Japanese authorities found liquid samples of anthrax spores within the 
vicinity of the rooftop sprayer utilized in downtown Tokyo.  Whether or not the weapon 
was employed successfully is a different matter, but based on this data, the group had the 
capability to weaponize the agent in a liquid form. 
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3. Employing Agents 
The Rajneeshees and anthrax studies showed that the ability to employ the chosen 
agent was present in both situations.  The employment methods were crude but effective.  
Their overall impact on society ranged from inundating public health systems, to 
economic fallout, to psychological influence.  The Rajneeshee cult’s basic method of 
dissemination of the liquid over salad bars and into coffee and salad dressing containers 
made at a minimum 751 people ill.  The anthrax attackers’ rudimentary envelope 
technique killed 5 people, sickened 17 others, and exposed an estimated 10,000 to the 
anthrax spores.  Based on these results alone, the two perpetrators displayed capability to 
employ two very distinct germs in two unique styles. 
Once again, the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s experience with anthrax is distinctive.  If 
one puts the non-virulent agent issue aside, the cult weaponized it to some success into 
liquid form for use in sprayers.  Those sprayers spread an unknown quantity of anthrax; 
however, clogging problems were reported in all of the group’s sprayer operations.  
Employment is deemed a success here with some capability demonstrated based on the 
authorities obtaining the anthrax samples at the sight of dissemination. 
The clogging sprayers are an issue that the cult would have had to work through 
eventually to sufficiently spread a virulent form of anthrax.  Had the compounds not been 
raided by Japanese police because of the unrelated Sarin attacks in 1995, the sprayer 
issues may have been overcome in one of two ways.  First, this technical issue was 
probably the least of their problems from a BW perspective.  With the presence of 
engineers and physicists, this would have been a more welcome and comfortable BW 
issue to work through than other microbiology specific problems.  Second, the evolution 
of commercial sprayers and foggers would eventually have been investigated for use by 
the group.  Even today, the availability of these devices for small amounts of money is 







five micron range, modifications to already existing equipment are feasible.  Many 
already advertise particulate sizes down to the 20 micron range with some openly 
advertising well under ten.195 
4. Common Capabilities and Trends 
As mentioned previously, the foundation to successful BW employment appears 
to be obtaining a virulent pathogen.  Once that happened in the Rajneeshee and anthrax 
cases, weaponization and employment in some form—even if crude or basic—happened 
successfully.  In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, successful employment also followed in 
spite of the non-virulent anthrax strain.  The capability to weaponize and employ agents 
emerges as a much smaller obstacle to success than actually obtaining the pathogen in the 
first place. 
From a capabilities standpoint, this is extremely important from three 
perspectives.  First, the ease in which groups acquired pathogens makes defending 
against bioterrorism an arduous task.  It is the pivotal step in bioterrorism yet success 
came through several different avenues.  The cases describe access to select agents such 
as anthrax and to less severe but deadly ones such as typhoid.196  They also displayed 
access to much less virulent and very prevalent ones such as salmonella.  With groups 
being able to acquire a broad spectrum of agents and make use of both the virulent and 
less virulent ones for terrorism, a broad capability exists to obtain pathogens—deadly and 
non-lethal ones. 
Second, the apparent ease in every case to acquire the dual-use equipment 
necessary to weaponize the agents is surprising.  The Rajneeshees used its medical 
corporation to get equipment and possibly procured other necessities through its 
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laboratories associated with the medical clinics without raising any alarms.  The anthrax 
perpetrator(s) somehow did the same but with a leap in order of magnitude.  The safety 
and containment equipment necessary to work with such a hazardous pathogen were 
somehow available and utilized well enough to again avoid detection by co-workers, 
suppliers, and/or authorities.  Aum Shinrikyo utilized front companies and its legal 
medical organization status to obtain vast amounts of equipment and supplies.  The cult 
was building a vast laboratory at the time it was raided by authorities.  The small 
footprint and dual-use nature of the equipment necessary to weaponize agents helped 
enable this ability. 
Third, the ability to disseminate the weapons without military-style tactics (e.g., 
aircraft equipped with sprayers or artillery shells/missiles laden with agents) is prevalent 
in all cases.  Dropping liquid agent unsuspectingly into coffee creamer and salad dressing 
bottles and mailing envelopes with dry-powder anthrax allowed successful dissemination 
without attribution.  Aum Shinrikyo utilized more complex spraying procedures that 
offered more hurdles; however, commercial sprayer technology or engineers associated 
with the program probably could have overcome those issues given more time and 
advancements in technology available to the general public. 
The trend when reviewing these cases is summarized very simply—ease in 
acquisition, weaponization, and basic dissemination.  Bioterrorism can be accomplished 
relatively easily after obtaining a pathogen that serves the group’s purpose.  The threat of 
bioterrorism continues to evolve especially as terrorists climb the capability learning-
curve.  The multiple capabilities revealed in this thesis in the areas of obtaining, 
weaponizing, and employing BW illustrate that terrorists are climbing that curve and 
finding ingenious ways to do so.  A broad spectrum of capability exists today. 
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF A CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACH 
This thesis finds a significant amount of capability to be in existence.  Some 
might ask so what?  Initially, the findings of this study might suggest bioterrorism is 
simple and when obstacles exist, they are easily overcome.  A logical conclusion might 
be that the government must ascertain capability about every group remotely interested in 
BW, and then the threat can be effectively defended against.  The results of this study 
suggest otherwise and answer the “so what?” question. 
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This thesis began with the assumption that motivation and intent of a group must 
be assumed from a policy perspective due to the number of terrorist groups and lone-wolf 
actors worldwide.  To determine the intent of all is impossible leading one to the 
conclusion that it is vital to assume someone or some group has the intent.  The results of 
this thesis reveal the same attributes for capability.  In all three cases, surmising the 
ability of the groups to conduct BW research and master on some level the three areas 
required for BW employment was nearly impossible for authorities.  Determining 
capability is just as difficult as determining motivation and intent for similar reasons.   
Based on this information, a more general take on capability for threat assessment 
purposes must be taken in order to effectively utilize the results of this or similar studies 
and thereby make proper use of biodefense resources.  Obviously, if specific BW 
capability information becomes available about a group or individual, that information 
combined with any knowledge of intent to use that capability or target certain 
vulnerabilities will significantly elevate the overall BW risk assessment for the time-
being.  Otherwise, a broad perspective on capability should be taken. 
The capabilities displayed in the three case studies can be applied to any terrorist 
group with the intent to use BW tactics.  Just as in the case of intent, knowing the actual 
level of capability by specific groups will be uncertain unless intelligence sources bring 
forth other information.  By assuming interested groups today will have similar ease in 
acquisition of a pathogen and the subsequent weaponization and employment of the 
agent, a general but focused biodefense policy can be formulated. 
Contrarian viewpoints from similar information have emerged.  Perhaps the most 
vocal academic opponent to current biodefense policy is Milton Leitenberg.  For 
example, he minimizes any BW capability possible by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan during 
the timeframe of 1997 to early 2002.  According to Leitenberg, Al Qaeda had great 
interest in BW and specifically anthrax during this timeframe.  U.S. forces uncovered 
evidence to support the group’s interest and their subsequent research and development; 
however, that same evidence also showed that Al Qaeda members had been unable to 
acquire a deadly strain of anthrax for their program.197  Based on this inability to obtain 
                                                 
197 Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, 34. 
75 
anthrax, Leitenberg greatly downplays the threat posed by Al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups such as Aum Shinrikyo.  This study shows that once successful agent acquisition 
occurs weaponization and employment normally follow with some degree of success.  
Leitenberg’s assumption that virtually no threat exists because a group could not acquire 
an agent for the time-being mischaracterizes the risk and fails to recognize the capability 
that a terrorist group can bring.  A group that already has established intent and is 
actively researching within a BW program has been proven to already have significant 
capability.  Based on the results of this thesis, a contrarian viewpoint to Leitenberg 
unfolds.  Significant capability exists and could quickly manifest itself in the form of an 
actual attack if the group acquires a deadly or at least a serious germ such as salmonella 
to inflict mass effects.  Actual demonstration of capability through manifestation of an 
attack should not be required to assume capability and therefore threat—biodefense 
policy demands a more thorough pre-judgment of that risk. 
Even so, capability should not be the only factor considered for a threat 
assessment.  The approach assumed in this thesis—intent and vulnerabilities always 
being existent—allows for the varying level of capability to drive the baseline biodefense 
policy.  As stated, if a unique vulnerability comes to light or concrete intent is discovered 
to exist within a group, temporary changes in biodefense strategy and tactics must 
happen.  In the meantime, a baseline strategy must be in place to deal with the nebulous 
bioterrorism threat.  Aligning this policy against capability allows the most efficient use 
of the government and private sector’s finite resources.   
C. BIOTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT 
This thesis assumes motivation and intent to utilize bioterrorism will always be 
present by some individual or group.  Al Qaeda reported its desire for both BW and 
nuclear terrorism as recently as September 2006.  The thesis also assumes vulnerability to 
all types of terrorism will be present on some level.  As Secretary of Homeland Security 
Chertoff stated, the country cannot afford to protect every vulnerability—it would 
bankrupt the U.S. government.  Vulnerability to BW will always exist based on this and 
the wide spectrum across which BW can be implemented throughout society.  As 
described by this study, capability existed and continues to persist today in the areas 
relating to biological weapons and use of them by terrorist groups. 
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It would be remiss and prove useless to classify the threat as high or low or 
somewhere in between.  That type of characterization fails by either minimizing an actual 
threat or over-hyping it giving policy makers tasked with dealing with the problem 
improper guidance on the actual situation.  A more useful description exists based on the 
assumptions of this thesis and the data collected in the case studies.  A BW threat exists 
today.  It is significant enough to address now before it becomes a grave threat in the 
future; however, that threat subsists in different form than that planned for by the U.S. 
government at present.  This assessment of the risk more concretely describes it in a way 
that neither minimizes its severity nor over-emphasizes its importance over other national 
security issues.  The question for policy makers is what to do with biodefense policy in 
light of this threat assessment.  The following section provides recommendations to U.S. 
biodefense policy stemming from the results of this study. 
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this thesis and the subsequent threat assessment point to required 
improvements in three areas of U.S. biodefense policy:  the nonproliferation regime, 
attribution capability, and perhaps most importantly, what attack scenarios should be 
focused upon for defense. 
1. The Nonproliferation Regime 
The case studies indicate that capability to conduct a BW attack increases 
immensely once a pathogen is obtained.  Regardless of the quality of the weaponization 
or employment abilities of a group, normally an ability to conduct at least a basic attack 
will subsequently manifest itself.  More stringent nonproliferation policies may not have 
prohibited the groups from obtaining potentially lethal pathogens since many such as 
salmonella are not on the select agent listing.  Even so, strengthening international 
nonproliferation activities, such as those of the Australia group and the BTWC, will make 
it more difficult for terrorists to obtain these pathogens and the necessary equipment for 
weaponization in the future, especially in the international arena.   
The Australia Group is the only entity in existence to help enforce any part of the 
BTWC.  It formed in 1984 following UN investigation discovering Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons.  The precursor chemicals and equipment necessary to produce these weapons 
were many times procured through legal international trade agreements so some countries 
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began to enforce more strict but non-uniform export controls.  To standardize and 
streamline the process, Australia suggested the countries with these export controls to 
meet and solidify a single plan.  Since then, the group has also adopted similar controls 
for dual-use equipment and biological agents.  The group includes 39 countries in 
addition to the entire European Commission.198  Increasing membership or mandatorily 
tying membership to signing the BTWC will help to ensure dangerous select agents and 
associated equipment are only being transferred legally to entities that have justifiable 
reasons to obtain them.  Making the entry costs to biological terrorism with agents such 
as anthrax too high will help to either drive a group out of the bioterrorism group all 
together or require them to use less dangerous substances. 
The BTWC currently has no verification protocols such as those enjoyed by the 
nuclear and chemical weapons nonproliferation regimes.  Obviously, the small footprint 
and dual-use nature of manufacturing equipment combined with many countries’ 
concerns about inspection on commercial companies make obtaining verification 
inspections difficult.  This is highlighted, for example, by the United States backing away 
from the 2001 verification protocols suggested in the fifth review conference for the 
BTWC.199  Verification inspections sound appropriate because the nuclear and chemical 
regimes utilize them; however, they may be impractical and inspecting only those 
countries that are already complying with regulations. 
Based on the relative ease demonstrated in this case to culture the agents and 
employ them once they are obtained, the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime to 
prohibit future access of pathogens only seems logical.  The best answer may be to 
rapidly push for tying the Australia Group against BTWC membership and subsequent 
approval of BTWC review conferences.  This would bolster transparency and therefore 
security of the global trade and movement of harmful pathogens and associated 
equipment. 
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2. Attribution 
Attribution, let alone prevention, is extremely difficult in bioterrorism.  When a 
group has the will, intent, and capability, the possibility of stopping them prior to a BW 
attack is minimal.200  If terrorists actually employ a weapon, attributing that attack is 
perhaps even more difficult.  As for the Rajneeshees, the case would have conceivably 
gone unsolved forever had their leader not come forward and personally requested an 
investigation one year later. 
In an interview at the time of the attacks, epidemiologist for the Oregon Health 
Division working the case, Dr. Laurence R. Foster, stated that the most likely hypothesis 
for the contamination came from a food service worker with diarrhea who handled the 
food thereby passing the salmonella bacteria on to whatever they touched.  He also 
hypothesized that other sources could have been contaminated water, raw milk, or contact 
with pets suffering from diarrhea.201  In a written statement in November 1984, Foster 
reiterated his comments, saying no evidence supported deliberate contamination and 
evidence pointed to food handling issues.202  The idea of a bioterrorism event was not 
plausible at this point in history so it was quickly dismissed as a possibility and shows 
how difficult attribution of a bioterrorism incident can be. 
Lack of attribution is perhaps the most disheartening fact from not knowing who 
committed the anthrax atrocities of 2001.  After years of unprecedented investigations, 
the country has been unable to discern who conducted the attacks.  Without this ability 
now and in the future, the U.S. government cannot retaliate nor have a valid deterrence 
against such attacks.  The inability to attribute the attacks to anyone over the past five 
years is a nuance terrorists are sure not to have missed.  Nuclear materials and 
conventional explosives leave tell-tale signs of where and how they were manufactured.  
Biological weapons rarely offer this same characteristic to investigators and policymakers 
who wish to pursue or punish those responsible for inappropriately using them.  
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Attribution is an extremely difficult but important facet of biodefense and overall U.S. 
defense policy.  Deterrence of attacks, if it can be done, requires an attribution capability. 
The President’s 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism states, “…the rapid 
identification of the source and perpetrator of an attack will enable our response efforts 
and may be critical in disrupting follow-on attacks.  We will develop the capability to 
assign responsibility for the intended or actual use of WMD via accurate attribution…”203  
This strategy recognizes the attribution problem; however, as shown by the anthrax case 
study, the ability to actually carry out the assignment under the current intelligence, 
investigative, and public health structures is difficult if not impossible.  Attribution 
networks must be developed for future biological weapon attacks and effective 
epidemiological response to natural outbreaks of widespread disease.  By building these 
networks, it increases the ability to identify the agent, characterize the event as natural or 
terrorist, and attribute it to a person, organization or state.  Policymakers will then have 
the ability to truly use deterrence as a tool against this type of terrorist tactic and respond 
in kind when attacks do occur.204  These same networks will also help in defending 
against future attack scenarios. 
3. Defending Against Future Attacks 
Jessica Stern, lecturer in Public Policy at the Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs at Harvard University, writes that terrorism is not a static 
phenomenon, and it tends to change via evolution rather than be revolutionary.205  
Terrorism history supports this statement, and if it is to be believed, it suggests that 
bioterrorism is evolving much in the way that biotechnology is evolving.  Revolutionary 
changes such as military-like precision attacks on a massive scale with select agents are 
probably not right around the corner but still something to be aware of by policymakers.  
Instead, the use of anything from simple pathogens to select agents on less hardened 
targets via basic employment techniques is more probable.  Stern states, “Governments 
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should pay more attention to more likely kinds of attacks, which would kill tens or 
hundreds rather than millions.  Such attacks could involve the use of low-technology 
dissemination devices to poison food, livestock, agricultural products…”206  Government 
defense against the Cold War bioagents such as anthrax should still be in place but with 
less focus.  U.S. policy should move towards defending against a broad spectrum of 
lower impact attacks.  Defending against these will actually improve the overall response 
to even more devastating attacks like one perpetrated with anthrax. 
a. Simple Pathogens and Simple Delivery 
The Rajneeshee attacks demonstrate how a simple pathogen such as 
salmonella can be easily obtained, weaponized, and disseminated efficiently using 
uncomplicated procedures.  The group confirmed to future terrorists that widespread 
bioterrorism effects do not require obtaining a select agent such as anthrax, nor does it 
necessitate complex, military-style dissemination.  The anthrax attacks illustrate terrorists 
may continue to move away from the tough issues of state bioweapons delivery systems 
in favor of these types of simple techniques and target less hardened infrastructure.  The 
case suggests that one only needs to gain access to a pathogen and weaponize it to some 
basic level.  Efficiency of the delivery system is not nearly as important.  Aum Shinrikyo 
may have demonstrated this same concept.  Despite its basic sprayers clogging, non-
virulent anthrax was dispersed.  With commercial technology evolution and the 
engineering background of several in the cult, more time to work out these issues could 
have enabled more effective systems as well. 
b. Agroterrorism 
Malcolm Dando believes that bioterrorism attacks in the next 15 years 
could not only be against humans but plants and animals as well.207  While this statement 
seemed to speak to specifically poisoning plants and animals for some gain, it also 
alludes to the idea of such things as agroterrorism to have a “weapon of mass disruption” 
type of effect.  By poisoning food somewhere in the food chain from production through 
distribution channels, terrorists have a strong chance of impacting the economy and 
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American psyche in addition to making people sick if not causing outright death.  The 
spinach E. coli outbreak during the fall of 2006 illustrates this point clearly with its large 
economic impact and direct affect on American’s thoughts about the safety of their 
food.208  The Rajneeshee cult proved this type of attack to be simple to achieve on a large 
scale as well. 
c. Smaller Objectives and Multiple Sites 
All three cases put forth the lesson of targeting less likely objectives while 
hitting multiple locations.  If a group attacked tens if not hundreds of small communities 
across the United States that were not the typically anticipated large targets such as New 
York, Los Angeles, or Washington, D.C., the overall effect would be amplified 
throughout the country.  When a terrorist group can strike a small, middle-American 
town, it brings terrorism home to everyone’s doorstep.  The American public would 
collectively ask themselves if terrorists can strike their town next.  Bioterrorism is a 
simple manner to accomplish this style of attack and does not require lethal select agents. 
d. The Public Health System 
Attacks that utilize rudimentary weaponization and employment 
techniques targeting less hardened and multiple targets are probably the near future for 
bioterrorism—mass effects rather than mass destruction.  The threat assessment of this 
thesis stems from the capability already displayed to accomplish this sort of attack.  
Although smallpox, anthrax, and other dangerous agents still require the U.S. 
government’s focus, consequence management or perhaps more specifically, 
epidemiological response in the form of the country’s public health structure, should be 
bolstered. 
As Stern writes, terrorism tactics evolve especially in the face of 
counterterrorism (CT) measures.  Hijackings became more difficult due to CT policies so 
terrorists began blowing up airplanes. Governments responded to car bombs by putting 
up concrete barriers and made driving onto certain installations more difficult.  In 
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response, larger explosives such as truck bombs were used to increase the blast area.209  
Terrorists will continue to improvise and evolve in bioterrorism as well.  The capability 
suggested in the study displays the increased ability to obtain pathogens but still 
weaponize and employ them with basic, improvised methods—whether they are simple 
pathogens or select agents. 
Government focus on improving the public health system to respond better 
to any large natural or man-made outbreak will improve the country’s overall ability to 
deal with a biological attack in the future.  The resulting biodefense focus becomes a plus 
not only in dealing with any type of attack, but it also increases the overall effectiveness 
of public health care offered to U.S. citizens.  As of now, the government should move 
away from large research spending on anthrax and other such diseases and begin 
investing in the public health infrastructure and attribution networks.  From post-9/11 
through February 2006, the U.S. government had spent $33 billion on biodefense with an 
estimated $7 billion being spent annually.210  A majority of this money is spent on 
research and development of and relating to select agents. Re-allocating money to more 
broad programs that will help the public health response to any incident is a more 
appropriate use of finite resources.211 
This thesis developed a capabilities approach as a piece in assessing the 
overall bioterrorism threat from non-state actors.  It assessed a broad spectrum of 
capability in all cases from obtaining pathogens to weaponizing and disseminating them.  
Based on this capability, the BW risk is assessed to be present but not something to over-
exaggerate to subordinate other more pertinent national security issues.  To adjust to this 
re-focused threat assessment, multiple recommendations have been made to U.S. 
biodefense policy.  By improving U.S. efforts in the nonproliferation regime, increasing 
attribution capabilities to enhance deterrence and potential retaliation, and recognizing  
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the changing nature of future attacks, the government can more appropriately allocate 
resources that will not only enhance biodefense capabilities but also greatly improve the 
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